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INTRODUCTION 
From the moment they emerged, humans have attempted to 
influence their surroundings.  A chief example is human use of 
plants and animals for food and medicinal purposes.  Human 
insight into the physical characteristics of plants and animals has 
led to continuous efforts to strengthen preferred characteristics and 
to eliminate disfavored ones.  By crossing and selection of animals 
and plants, humans have been able to accumulate preferred 
characteristics of parent animals in their offspring. 
Human capability to alter the biological constitution of animals 
and plants has always been limited.  Human influence has 
extended only to the conditions under which autonomous 
biological processes, such as natural reproduction, took place and 
even that influence was relatively small.  This limited influence 
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was due in part to scientists inability to interbreed animals 
belonging to different species due to physiological differences.1  
Other limitations stemmed from the long reproduction process, the 
uncertainty of outcomes, and the possibility that parents negative 
characteristics would be expressed in their offspring. 
Advances in genetics have broadened human capability to alter 
plants and animals.  Understanding the distinctive hereditary 
characteristics of organisms and the reasons for their expression 
has spurred a revolutionary change in the biological discipline.  
The knowledge acquired by scientists in the past 150 years has 
made manipulation of the biochemical compounds and processes 
that determine the formation of hereditary characteristics possible.  
Biotechnology enables organic alteration of biological material, 
such as animals. 
The development of biotechnology has removed the initial 
barrier between biology and technology.  To a certain extent, life 
has a technical character that can be subjected to human-based 
technologies resulting in a kind of evolution on command.  
Accordingly, biology has changed from a merely descriptive 
science into one with concrete applications.  This change has 
enabled biotechnology to become subject matter protected under 
patent law. 
Patent law has been the natural source of protection for 
biotechnology.  It gives an inventor the right to exclude others 
from using his patented invention for a certain period of time.  
Traditionally, life was not covered under patent law.  Although 
this exclusion started to change in the nineteenth century because 
of advances in microbiology, multicellular organisms such as 
plants and animals remained outside of the scope of patent law 
until far into the twentieth century.2  Patent law adapted in scope to 
 
1 See HENDERSONS DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGICAL TERMS 507 (12th ed. 2000) (defining 
species as a group of interbreeding individuals not normally able to interbreed with other 
such groups and subdivided into subspecies, geographic races and varieties).  A 
geographic race is a group of individuals within a species which forms a permanent and 
genetically distinguishable variety. Id. at 204.  A variety is a taxonomic group below the 
species level. Id. at 578. Varieties are variances; deviations from the mean. Id. 
2 See infra Part II.CD (discussing the expansion of patent law doctrine to 
accommodate biotechnology). 
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include protection for multicellular organisms.  These organisms 
have led to key biotechnological inventions in the past fifty years. 
The genetic transformation of agricultural and other animals 
has had widespread effects.  Transformation of animals led to the 
production of new and better medicines and improved nutrition.  
The creation of animals in which human genetic diseases, such 
as certain cancers develop in vivo,3 has facilitated research of 
cancer prevention, detection, and treatment.  Moreover, genetic 
modification has enabled animals to thrive in environments in 
which originally they could not survive and thereby has had great 
strides in the battle against hunger.  Biotechnology has also led to 
the development of enzymes that destroy pollutants and modified 
organisms that benefit security and defense by breaking down 
dangerous gases. 
The universal and far-reaching consequences of biotechnology 
have stimulated research and development.  The number of patent 
applications filed globally for biotechnological inventions 
increases every year, while many patents for modified animals 
already exist.  The development of animal biotechnological 
inventions is particularly important for the realization of 
biotechnological promise. 
The conditions under which biotechnological inventions are 
patentable influence the pace of such realization.  The scope of 
patentability has a profound impact on the incentive to invest in 
biotechnology.  Biotechnological research and development 
depends mostly on private market actors.  These actors are 
companies that focus on biotechnological development, creation, 
and marketing of products therefrom.  The differing patentability 
standards that exist in different countries may create an uneven 
playing field.  Because genetic modification of animals may have 
great and far-reaching consequences on evolution, it is important to 
address the extent of human participation in this process.  From the 
human perspective, the scope of patentability plays a critical role.  
The standards for patentability of animal biotechnological 
inventions must be determined responsibly and evaluated 
 
3 See STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1951 (26th ed. 1995) (defining in vivo as in 
the living body, referring to a process or reaction occurring therein). 
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accurately.  The presumed universal reach of biotechnology and 
the primarily international focus of the actors involved in its 
development and application demands harmonization of the major 
patent regimes involved. 
Harmonization of patent law is necessary to reduce regional 
trade barriers that derive from differing standards of patentability.  
Moreover, harmonization is critical to infuse responsible 
limitations into standards of patentability.  For patenting modified 
animals, the important regimes are the United States (U.S.), the 
European Union (EU), and Japan.  Harmonization means that 
compromises must be made.  Certain approaches will be adapted 
and adopted, while others will be abolished entirely. 
This Article focuses on the patentability of animals under the 
patent regimes of the U.S. and EU.  Differences and similarities 
will be described along with preferences relevant to particular 
inventions.  The applicable law and scholarly opinions will be 
reviewed.  Relevant biotechnological and ethical realities will be 
considered.4 
The Article is divided into five Parts.  Part I will describe the 
disciplines involved, introducing the reader to the fields of 
genetics, biotechnology, and patent law.  Part II will describe the 
legal basis of U.S. patent law, its requirements and exclusions.  
Additionally, it will concentrate on animal patents in the U.S., in 
light of applicable statutes, case law, and guidelines promulgated 
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  Part III will 
discuss the legal basis of EU patent law, its requirements and 
 
4 This work covers a broad and interdisciplinary field.  Given the limited scope of this 
article and the number of complex issues that arise when comparing specific rules of law 
in different cultures, an analysis of the Japanese regime is not included.  The legal 
perspective will be the starting point of analysis, whereas other perspectives will be 
considered to the extent that they are useful.  In view of the breadth of this field, and the 
numerous issues and questions that arise in its exploration, this work cannot be 
exhaustive.  Furthermore, legal regimes and positions will be reviewed that operate in 
different legal traditions, such as the U.S. common law and continental EU civil law.  
While many possible solutions are similar, the approach taken may differ.  For example, 
the common law tradition addresses legal problems on a case-by-case basis, whereas in 
the civil law tradition, legislatures anticipate potential problems and attempt to 
preemptively tackle them by enacting statutes and regulations.  Although these general 
differences will arise in the course of this article, it is difficult to offer a comprehensive 
analysis given the limited scope of this article. 
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exclusions, and EU patentability standards.  Part IV will offer a 
comparison of the patentability of animals in the EU and the U.S.  
It will focus on the differences in standards, exclusions, and scopes 
of patentability in both countries.  Part V will focus on the need to 
bridge the animal biotechnological gaps between the U.S. and EU 
and a way to harmonize their differences.  A brief proposal for 
harmonization of the substantive provisions affecting the manner 
in which transgenic animals are patented under both regimes is 
included. 
I. GENETICS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND PATENT LAW 
A. Genetics 
The term genetics5 originates from the Greek words 
genesis (origin) and genetès (originator) and the Latin terms 
genus (nature), generalis (specific), and generatio 
(origination).  The term genetics is much newer than the terms 
from which it derives.  Indeed, the roots of the science of heredity 
lie in the nineteenth century. 
Scholars commonly regard the Austrian monk Gregor Mendel 
as the founding father of the science of heredity and, therefore, of 
modern genetics.6  Mendel experimented with the hybridization of 
split peas and discovered a pattern in which two plants passed 
distinctive characteristics onto their offspring.7  Mendel discovered 
that certain biological compounds play a role in the hereditary 
process.  He published his discoveries in 1866.8 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch botanist 
de Vries and the English biologist Bateson repeated Mendels 
 
5 See STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 713 (defining genetics as the 
branch of science concerned with the means and consequences of transmission and 
generation of the components of biological inheritance). 
6 See generally ELDON JOHN GARDNER ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 15 (8th ed. 
1991). 
7 See generally JAMES DARNELL ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 56 (2d ed. 1990). 
8 Gregor Mendel, Versuche uber Pfanzenhybriden [Experiments with Plant 
Hybridization], Natural Scientific Association of Brno, reprinted in MENDELS 
PRINCIPLES OF HEREDITY 33579 (William Bateson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 
1913) (1866). 
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experiments.  Bateson and de Vries confirmed Mendels 
conclusions and from then on, scientists started to search for the 
carriers of heredity.  Even before the 20th century, cell research 
had emerged.  In 1869, the Swiss researcher Kossel discovered that 
a cell nucleus contains protein and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).9  
He further discovered that DNA not only consists of a phosphate 
backbone,10 but also of nucleic acid made up of four nucleotide 
bases: adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G), 
and a sugar (deoxyribose).  In 1882, the German researcher, Walter 
Flemming, discovered that threadlike structures, known as mitotic 
spindles, exist in the nucleus.11 Flemmings experiments showed 
that mitotic spindles multiply upon cell division and that every new 
cell contains one identical structure of the mothercell.12 
In 1952, the research of Americans Alfred Hershey and Martha 
Chase showed that DNA penetrated the cell walls of bacteria, 
while the viral proteins did not.13  They concluded that DNA is the 
carrier of hereditary material.14  The next year, the American 
scientist, James D. Watson, together with his English colleague, 
Francis H. Crick, characterized the physical structure of DNAthe 
double helix.15  The strands of the double helix are 
complementary; the nucleotide bases A and T pair with one 
another, as do the bases C and G.  Watson and Cricks model 
demonstrated that the hereditary code must be determined by the 
 
9 See Dr. Frederick A. Aldrich, Sciencefare, GAZETTE, Mar. 18, 1997, at 2 (stating that 
in work for which he received the Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology in 1910, a 
German biochemist named Albrecht Kossel was able to isolate, by hydrolysis from 
Meischers nucleic acid, a series of four nitrogen-bearing compounds or bases which he 
called adenine, guanine, cytosine and thymine), available at http://www.mun.ca/sgs/ 
science.march1877.html. 
10 See STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1354 (defining phosphate as 
a salt or ester of phosphoric acid). 
11 See generally DARNELL, supra note 7, at 7. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 11. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.; see also STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 768 (defining helix 
as a line in a shape of a coil . . . , each point being equidistant from a straight line that is 
the axis of the cylinder in which each point of the h[elix] lies); id. at 769 (explaining that 
a double helix is the helical structure assumed by two strands of DNA, held together 
throughout their length by hydrogen bombs between bases on opposite strands, referred 
to as Watson-Crick base pairing). 
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linear sequence of the four bases on the strings.16  Watson and 
Crick further determined that upon cell division, the DNA is 
replicated.  During replication, the double helix disentangles and 
the two strands move apart.  Every strand functions as a template 
for the formation of a new strand, of which the bases will 
subsequently pair with the complementary bases.  Although 
Watson and Crick clarified the structure and formation of DNA, it 
took several years to determine DNAs manner of expression and 
the way to decipher its code. 
Scientists moved closer to deciphering DNAs code when the 
functioning of enzymes involved in protein synthesis was clarified 
and in vitro17 translation systems were developed.  As a result of 
these developments, it became possible to decipher the genetic 
code.  In 1972, the first successful genetic manipulation was 
achieved, and recombinant-DNA18 was produced.19  In that same 
year, scientists effectuated an important biotechnological 
application of recombinant DNA technology, i.e., the production of 
human growth hormone. 
B. Biotechnology 
DNA is a polymer of nucleotides.20  A nucleotide consists of 
three componentsa five-carbon sugar, an inorganic phosphate, 
and a nitrogen base.21  As previously mentioned, DNA contains the 
bases A, G, T, and C.22  The way the genetic code is constituted is 
the same in any organism.  Hence, the species restriction that exists 
with breeding and selection does not exist at the biochemical level.  
In all organisms, the structure of DNA is formed by two 
 
16 See DARNELL, supra note 7, at 11. 
17 See STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 889 (defining in vitro as a 
process or reaction occurring in an artificial environment, as in a test tube or culture 
media). 
18 See id. at 1511 (defining recombinant-DNA [hereinafter rec-DNA] as [a]ltered 
DNA resulting from the insertion into the chain, by chemical, enzymatic, or biological 
means, of a sequence (a whole or partial chain of DNA) not originally (biologically) 
present in that chain). 
19 See GARDNER, supra note 6, at 18. 
20 See generally id. at 92127 (describing the constitution and functioning of DNA). 
21 See id. at 97. 
22 See supra notes 912 and accompanying text. 
3-KOOPMAN FORMAT 12/12/02 3:19 PM 
112 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:103 
intertwined polynucleotides, which are held together by nitrogen 
bonds.  The complementary bases are paired, A with T and G with 
C.  A group of three bases is called a triplet.23  A triplet codes for a 
specific amino acid.  A combination of amino acids, encoded by a 
combination of triplets, comprises a particular protein with a 
particular function.  All combined triplets form the entire genetic 
code of an organism.24  Through processes known as 
transcription25 and translation,26 genes are expressed and the 
formation of particular proteins and ultimately all physiological 
features of an organism are determined. 
The use of recombinant-DNA (hereinafter rec-DNA) permits 
genetic engineering and the genetic modification of organisms.27  
This technology allows for the recombination of genetic material 
of more than one organism.  Genes can be introduced and removed 
or blocked.  An organism in which foreign material from an 
organism of a different species is introduced is called transgenic.28  
Restriction enzymes are crucial for the formation of rec-DNA 
because they recognize particular base sequences and cut the DNA 
strand at those sites.29  The singular cut DNA strands can have 
sticky ends.  Uneven DNA of a different source that is cut with the 
same restriction enzyme will have the complementary sticky ends.  
When DNA fragments so obtained are mixed and joined through a 
process known as ligation, rec-DNA is created.30  Often, DNA is 
 
23 See generally STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1856 (stating that a 
triplet can be used to describe a group of three bases in DNA and transfer-RNA 
[hereinafter t-RNA], to be discussed below); id. at 361 (stating that such a group in 
messenger-RNA [hereinafter m-RNA] is called a codon). 
24 The genetic code was deciphered in 1961, and accordingly, the world learned which 
combination of triplets codified which proteins. See J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence 
of the Human Genome, 291 SCI. 1304 (2001) (describing how scientists around the world 
unravelled the human genetic code). 
25 See generally STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1836 (stating that 
transcription is where the message of the combination is transcribed to the m-RNA). 
26 See generally id. (stating that translation is where the message is translated by the t-
RNA to enable protein synthesis). 
27 See id. 
28 Id. at 1030. 
29 See DARNELL, supra note 7, at 20612 (describing the formation of rec-DNA in more 
detail). 
30 See generally STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1655.  This is 
called splicing. 
3-KOOPMAN FORMAT  12/12/02 3:19 PM 
2002] PATENTABILITY OF TRANSGENIC ANIMALS 113 
recombined into certain vehicles employed to transfer DNA 
fragments into host cells.  These vehicles, most commonly 
plasmids31 and viruses,32 are called vectors.33  Cells containing 
foreign DNA are often selected on the basis of antibiotic resistance 
genes carried by the vector. 
Other methods used for the transfer and recombination of 
foreign DNA fragments, in vivo34or in vitro,35 are electroporation 
(changing the density of cell membranes though electric impulses 
whereby DNA can leak in); micro-injection (injecting DNA into 
the cell nucleus); nucleus transplantation (replacing the nucleus of 
a zygote with a foreign nucleus); DNA gun (bombarding cells with 
particles coated with foreign DNA); and cell extraction (mixing 
cells as such).36  These methods may be applied in combination 
with other technologies, such as cloning, mutagenesis (chemical or 
radioactive treatment of cells whereby the DNA is altered), 
artificial insemination, embryo transplantation, and embryo 
fusion.37  These techniques are applied to animals to serve various 
goals, as discussed below. 
 
31 Plasmids are independent circular DNA molecules that have the capability to 
replicate within the organism in which they are introducedand express their DNA. 
Plasmids are rapidly exchanged between cells, and transfect the cells easily, which makes 
them very suitable for DNA introduction in an organism. 
32 Viruses are also used to introduce foreign DNA. 
33 See STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1911 (defining a vector as 
DNA such as a chromosome or plasmid that autonomously replicates in a cell to which 
another DNA segment may be inserted and be itself replicated as in a cloning.  The 
Greek Charon, a known vector, was the ferryman who transferred the souls of the 
deceased to the next world.). 
34 See id. at 1951. 
35 See id. at 889. 
36 See E.S. VAN DE GRAAF, PATENT LAW AND MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY ABOUT THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION 28 
(1997) (providing further explanation of these methods); Larry Gold & Joseph Alper, 
Keeping Pace with Genomics Through Combinatorial Chemistry, 15 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 297 (1997) (Embryo fusion results in animals that are the sum of the 
parts of the parents. These animals, called chimaeras, are named after the fire-breathing 
chimera in Greek mythology that had the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of 
a serpent.). 
37 See DARNELL, supra note 7; BIEMANS ET AL., DNAEEN BLAUWDRUK [DNAA 
BLUEPRINT] 142 (1993). 
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C. Goals of Animal Biotechnology 
1. Medical Purpose 
Genetic modification of animals can serve various medical 
purposes.  First, animal models can enable researchers to study the 
functions of specific genes.  Integration of foreign DNA can result 
in the expression of new genetic information, but it can also block 
the expression of existing genetic information.  The gene function 
can be identified by blocking expression and observing the 
changes that result.  Second, genetically-modified animals enable 
scientists to learn the expression and workings of genetically 
determined hereditary human diseases.  For example, a scientist 
trying to enhance understanding of a certain cancer may insert 
human oncogenes (i.e., cancer-causing genes) into animals to study 
their expression in an unnatural environment.  Scientists may find 
it advantageous to study the function of oncogenes in non-human 
mammals.  The Harvard mouse is an example of an animal that 
was created for this purpose.38  Third, genetic modification of 
animals may enable scientists to develop gene treatments for 
humans based on genetic modification of animals.39 For example, 
future treatments for humans with Albinism may stem from gene 
therapy of albino mice.  Like humans with Albinism, albino mice 
have a defect in the tyrosinase enzyme.40  Scientists have cloned 
the gene for the tyrosinase enzyme and inserted it into the nuclei of 
embryonic albino mice.  The treatments succeeded in helping the 
embryos grow into pigmented transgenic mice.  In the near future, 
this treatment, as well as others that have been used successfully in 
animals, may be applied successfully to humans.41  Fourth, 
 
38 The Harvard mouse enables analysis of human breast cancers.  It was modified in 
P. Leders lab at Harvard and subsequently patented in the U.S. and EU. 
39 While gene therapy on fertilized human egg cells has been prohibited worldwide, it 
has been conducted successfully on mice. 
40 See generally Vitali Alexeev et al., Localized in Vivo Genotypic and Phenotypic 
Correction of the Albino Mutation in Skin by RNA-DNA Oligonucleotide, 18 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 43 (2000). 
41 In 1993, the first human being underwent onco-gene therapy.  The treatment 
seenmed to have potential.  In 1999, gene therapy on a human being in the U.S. failed 
and the patient diedrealization of these therapies seems to be harder than once 
expected.  See Richard A. Morgan & W. French Anderson, Human Gene Therapy, 62 
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genetically modified animals could produce important medicinal 
proteins.42 The female offspring of Herman the bull, for example, 
secrete lactoferrin, a protein used to treat gastroenteritis and blood-
poisoning.43  A human gene introduced into Herman the bull 
resulted in a large production of the corresponding protein, 
lactoferrin. 
2. Veterinary Purpose 
 Biotechnological alterations can also serve the interests of 
modified animals.44  For example, the protein lactoferrin also 
protects Herman the bulls female offspring against udder 
infections.45  Moreover, genetic modification of agricultural 
animals, like cows, pigs, and chickens, can increase their 
productivity.  For example, scientists have genetically modified the 
bull Sunny Boy to increase its productivity.  Because of bio-
technological alterations, Sunny Boys female offspring now 
produce extraordinary quantities of milk.46 
 
ANN. REV. BIOTECHNOLOGY 191217 (1993) (discussing the benefits of oncogene 
therapy but recognizing that realization of these therapies seems to be harder than once 
expected); Vermij, Het Einde van een Wondertherapie [The End of a Miracle Therapy], 
WETENSCHAP & TECHNIEK [SCI. & TECH.], Jan. 13, 2000, at 1. See also Trisha Gura, 
After a Setback, Gene Therapy Progresses . . . Gingerly, 291 SCI. 1692 (2001) 
(presenting an example of a gene therapy that appears to have great potential for the 
treatment of hemophilia). 
42 Transgenic animals secrete particular proteins, e.g., in milk. 
43 See GARDNER, supra note 6, at 642; Philippe Ducor, Recombinant Products and 
Nonobviousness: A Typology, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3 
(1997) (describing production of other medicines, such as erythropoietin (EPO), through 
transgenic animals). 
44 See Lisa J. Raines, The Mouse That Roared, 1988 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 64. 
45 See id. at 6768. 
46 See generally Dan L. Burk, Patenting Trangenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost 
Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1635 (1993); Thomas Traian Moga, Transgenic 
Animals as Intellectual Property (or the Patented Mouse That Roared), 76 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 511, 530 (1994); Carrie F. Walter, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: 
Current Patent Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent 
Law, 73 IND. L.J. 1025, 1033 (1998). 
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3. Socio-Economic Purpose 
Agricultural animals may be genetically modified to enable 
their exploitation in what once were unsuitable environments.  For 
example, certain soils can only provide nutrition for 
a limited number of cows.  If one can increase milk production 
of the cows exploited in such an area, fewer animals would be 
needed to produce the same amount of milk.  This increase in milk 
production could boost socio-economic circumstances.  A similar 
approach might be adopted in creating resistance against certain 
diseases, such as sleeping sickness in cows.  In Zimbabwe, for 
example, sleeping sickness leads to inefficient milk and meat 
production.  Animal biotechnological research could possibly 
eliminate sleeping sickness by creating resistance in genetically 
modified animals.  These developments could increase life 
expectancy in developing countries and contribute positively to 
their socio-economic circumstances.47 
4. Environmental Purpose 
Genetic modification of animals may alter the functioning of 
certain organs in their offspring.48  For example, one may alter the 
intestinal function of a particular animal so that the amount of 
polluting secretions and unpleasant scents decreases.  Additionally, 
 
47 Such effects would also lower medical costs. Socioeconomic circumstances will not 
change drastically by the development of particular medicines only, because there are 
also political, ideological and similar considerations. On the other hand, gene therapy 
could be promising as an AIDS treatment in countries like Asia and Africa, where 
approximately ninety percent of AIDS patients live. Gene therapy seems to be promising 
for treatment of this illness. See Morgan, supra note 41; Ulrich Schatz, Patentability of 
Genetic Engineering Inventions in EPO Practise, 1 INTL REV. INDUS. PROP. & 
COPYRIGHT L. 4 (1998). The HIV blocker AZT has been developed through animal 
biotechnological research. Distribution of medicines may be problematic, however, in 
view of patents held on their active ingredients or methods of treating diseases by 
administering claimed compounds. See S. Abdool Karim, Globalization, Ethics and AIDS 
Vaccines, 288 SCI. 2129 (2000); Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War; 
U.S. Policy Keeps Prices Prohibitive, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at A1. 
48 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining that lactoferrin protects female 
offspring of Herman the Bull against udder infections). 
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animals may be modified so as to break down polluting substances 
in their direct environment, such as crude oil.49 
D. Patent Law 
Legal scholars commonly regard the Arrangement of Venice of 
1474 to be the oldest civil law patent statute.50  They consider the 
British Statute of Monopolies of 1623 to be the oldest common law 
patent statute.51  Patent law grants an inventor the temporary right 
to exclude others from the use of his or her technical invention.  
Governments, legal scholars, and economists consider 
technological innovation to be the most important factor in 
increasing productivity.  Economic progress requires a continuous 
stream of ideas and inventions to improve efficiency in production.  
Technological innovation leads to more effective use of labor, 
capital, and natural resources.  It can thereby lead to higher levels 
of productivity with less investment.  The subsequent economic 
growth, and the concomitant increase in wealth can lead to an 
improvement in quality of life, including improved health, 
educational, and social conditions. 
Despite the great rewards associated with patenting inventions, 
they require significant investment.52  Without patent protection, 
 
49 See PIETER VAN DOOREN, DE GENETISCHE REVOLUTIE [THE GENETIC REVOLUTION] 
66 (1994). 
50 See generally JAN J. BRINKHOF, Over Octrooi en Economie [About Patents and 
Economy] 795 (1990) (discussing the Arrangement of Venice statute); cf. Giuli Mandich, 
Venetian Patents (14501550), 30 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 166, 17581 
(1948) (describing the Venetian statute in more detail). 
51 The Statute of Monopolies, enacted in 1623, is one of a set of measures on economic 
matters enacted by the Tudors in the first quarter of the seventeenth century making use 
of proclamations of the king, whereby the statutory law grew in the English common law. 
Both the Statute of Monopolies and the Arrangement of Venice were intended to attract 
investment and know-how into the respective jurisdictions. The first reference to patents 
is thought to have been made by Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 3639 (Stephen Everson 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (360 B.C.E.). 
52 Private ownership and enhancement, i.e., the capitalistic economic model, are 
necessary assumptions for this argument.  See generally BRINKHOF, supra note 50, at 
794; Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, In Search of Useful Theory of Innovation, 6 
RESEARCH POLY 37 (1977).  Patent law, however, does not seem to be a prerequisite for 
technological innovation.  In the nineteenth century, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
experienced vast technological and economic development without having patent laws.  
In the twentieth century, a similar development occurred in South Korea, partly without 
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everyone could profit from the invention and free-ride on the 
investment that the inventor alone had to bear.  Patents address this 
issue by enabling the inventor to recover a profit for a period of 
time in which he or she retains exclusivity for this invention.  The 
inventor can also use this time period to advance the invention. 
An important aspect of patent protection is the exchange of 
informationthe inventor must expose the know-how related to 
the invention.  This allows others to build on the invention for 
experimental purposes, thereby encouraging the continuous flow of 
inventions.  After the period of patent protection has lapsed, the 
previously protected information falls into the public domain so 
that society may freely use that information. 
The informational function of patent law thereby strengthens 
the spread and use of technological expertise.53  The forthcoming 
chapters will describe the interaction between patent law and the 
development of biotechnological applications within the U.S. and 
EU. 
II. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
A. Legal Basis 
The Constitution gives Congress legislative authority to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
 
applicable patent laws.  See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1011 
(1982).  
53 See generally L. WICHERS HOETH, KORT BEGRIP VAN HET INTELLECTUELE 
EIGENDOMSRECHT [INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] 10 (1993); ROBERT 
M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 67, 191 (1990); 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], INTRODUCTION TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 45 (1997) (discussing further economic 
analysis and effect); Michael North, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: 
Creating a Competitive Advantage for Foreign Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INTL 
L.J. 111, 112117 (2000) (providing a comprehensive and concise economic analysis of 
corporate behavior and competition within countries with patent regimes); C. 
Oppenheim, The Information Function of the Patents, 1979 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 344. But see Ashoka Mody, New Environment for Intellectual Property, World 
Bank Industry Series Paper No. 3 (1989) (criticizing the assumption of the stimulative 
effect of patent law). 
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respective Writings and Discoveries.54 Congress has used this 
authority by enacting the U.S.  Patent Act (hereinafter the Act).55  
The PTO has the authority to examine patent applications and 
reject or issue patents.56  The Act is legally operative within the 
international framework.57 
 
B. Requirements 
Section 101 of the Act states that whoever invents or 
discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .58  Thus, a patentable 
invention must be a process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition that is a new and useful improvement upon the prior 
art. 
Section 102 of the Act describes the novelty requirement.59  In 
short, novelty means that the invention was not and could not have 
been known by someone other than the inventor before the 
inventor filed an application.  The invention could have been 
known if it was printed in any publicationincluding patent 
applicationsin any country.60 
Novelty is determined according to the moment of invention.61  
Another requirement of section 102 is utility, which contains three 
separate requirements.  First, the invention must be operable or 
capable of use (general utility).  Second, it must solve the problem 
it is designed to solve (specific utility).  Third, the invention must 
have a minimal social benefit and not be merely harmful or 
deleterious (beneficial utility).62 
 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
55 35 U.S.C. §§ 1376 (2000). 
56 See id. §§ 113. 
57  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307 (2000); infra Part 
V. 
58 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
59 Id. § 102. 
60 Id. § 102(a), (e). 
61 See id. § 102(a); id. § 102(g) (referring to prior art). 
62 See MERGES, supra note 52, at 189. 
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Section 103 of the Act further provides that a patent may not be 
granted if  the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious.63  The subject matter must not be obvious to a person 
skilled in the art.64  Nonobviousness may be a more difficult hurdle 
to surmount for patentability than the utility and novelty 
requirements because it demands that the invention comprise a 
technical accomplishment.  The technical step, moreover, must 
have certain significance.  It is beyond the scope of this article to 
go into the particular degree of significance necessary65 especially 
because this test is judge-made and highly abstract.  An applicant 
must show that the differences between the subject matter sought 
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter 
would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art.  In determining nonobviousness, a court considers: a) the 
scope and content of the prior art; b) the differences between the 
prior art and the claims at issue; and c) the level of ordinary skill in 
the pertinent art.66 
Pursuant to section 101 of the Act, the invention must either be 
a process, a machine, or a composition of matter.67  Section 100 of 
the Act defines process as process, art, or method, and includes a 
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition 
of matter, or material.68 A process may be patented, even if the 
resulting product cannot.69  A machine is defined as every 
mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and 
devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or 
 
63 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
64 See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(providing a list of factors relevant to the determination of the level of skill in the art, 
including type of problems encountered in the art and prior art solutions to those 
problems). 
65 See generally MERGES, supra note 62, at 479. 
66 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 1718 (1966); In re OFarrell, 853 F.2d 
894, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Custom Accessories Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 
955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1986); MERGES, supra note 62, at 479. 
67 35 U.S.C. § 100. 
68 Id. § 100(b); see generally Cohrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (describing 
the process as a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. The 
mode of treatment could be an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to 
be transformed to a different state or thing.). 
69 Eileen Morin, Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals, 5 HEALTH L.J. 
147, 153 (1997). 
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result.70  A manufacture is the production of articles from raw or 
non-raw materials by giving them new forms, characteristics, 
qualities, or combining them in a new fashion, regardless of 
whether it is done by hand or by machine.71  A composition of 
matter includes all compositions of two or more substances 
and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the result of 
chemical union, or mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, 
fluids, powders, or solids.72 
To be patentable, an inventor must satisfy the enablement 
requirement in section 112 of the Act.  An invention is enabling if 
the specifications and drawings of the claims enable any person 
skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention without 
undue experimentation.73  The purpose of the enablement 
requirement is to facilitate the teachings of the patent so that they 
may be repeated easily without wasting resources.  Moreover, it 
ensures that the inventors contribution is stable rather than 
fortuitous.74 
Section 154 describes the rights granted under an issued patent.  
The patentee receives the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
U.S. . . . and, if the invention is a process . . . the right to exclude 
others from using, offering for sale, or selling products made by 
the patented process. 
C. Exclusions 
The scope of patentable subject matter is broad, but limited.75  
For example, laws of nature, principles, physical phenomena, 
 
70 Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853). 
71 See, e.g., Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931). 
72 Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 28081 (D.D.C. 1957), affd, 
252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
73 See 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
74 See generally Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Timothy G. Hofmeyer, Comment, Everybodys Got Something to 
Hide Except Me and My Patented Monkey: Patentability of Cloned Organisms, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 971, 983 (1998). 
75 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (Congress plainly contemplated 
that the patent laws would be given wide scope . . . [but t]his is not to suggest that § 101 
has no limits or that it embraces every discovery.). 
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abstract ideas, and products of nature are not patentable.76  
Furthermore, human beings are not patentable, at least not on a 
statutory basis.77  The processes and products of human cloning
thus not including human beingsmay be patentable.  The federal 
government does not fund the use of this technology, however.78 
 
76 See, e.g., id. at 310 (finding that laws of nature, phenomena and abstract ideas held 
not patentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 6768 (1972) (deciding that 
mathematical algorithm is akin to mental process and unpatentable); Funk Bros. Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (finding that only process that applied 
phenomena to new and useful end patentable); OReilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 12728 
(1854) (holding that electro-magnetism used for printing signs, characters or letters is not 
patentable); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853) (stating that principle in abstract 
is fundamental truth and unpatentable); Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 
467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding that business method of bookkeeping was an abstract 
idea and not patentable). 
77 Pat. & Trademark Off. Notice: Animals-Patentability, reprinted in 1077 OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987) [hereinafter PTO Notice]. See also 
Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. 
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, 100th Cong. 22 (1987) 
(statement of Donald Quigg, Commissioner, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.). Several other 
bills, containing provisions that would limit patentability of human-animal subject matter, 
were introduced but never enacted. See H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 923, 105th 
Cong. (1998); H.R. 2326, 106th Cong. (1999).  Until now, human-related inventions 
were not statutorily excluded from patentability. See Mark Jagels, Dr. Moreau Has Left 
the Island: Dealing with Human-Animal Patents in the 21st Century, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 115, 14142 (2000). 
78 In 1997, the U.S. government prohibited federal funding of the application of these 
technologies on human beings and human materials. See Fact Sheet on Eight Years of 
Peace, Progress and Prosperity, Pres. William J. Clinton, 2001 WL 20770, at *14 
(documenting that President Clinton banned federal research on human cloning and asked 
the scientific community to recognize a voluntary moratorium on human cloning); 143 
CONG. REC. E607 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1997) (statement of Hon. Hamilton) (stating that 
President Clinton ordered a moratorium on the use of federal funds for human cloning 
and urging Congress to wait until a national bioethics commission reviews the legal and 
ethical issues surrounding cloning before it passes a bill to ban human cloning outright); 
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS COMMITTEE 13 (1997); Alexandra 
Hawkins, Protecting Human Dignity and Individuality: The Need for Uniformity in 
International Cloning Legislation, 14 TRANSNATL LAW 243, 274 (2001).  The Bush 
Administration has reconsidered this position and allows for federal funding of stem cell 
research. See, e.g., Pres. George W. Bush, Stem Cell Science and the Preservation of Life, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, at D13; Jeremy Rifkin, Will Companies Hold Control of Life 
Made in a Petri Dish?, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at B11; Sheryl Stolberg, The 
Presidents Decision: The Research; U.S. Acts Quickly to Put Stem Cell Policy in Effect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at A1; Editorial, Stem Cell Impasse, WASH. POST, July 12, 
2001, at A26 (describing various views on the cloning issue before Bush made his 
decision).  There were several cloning bills proposed in Congress but not ultimately 
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D. Patents for Transgenic Animals 
1. Historic Development 
The products of nature doctrine and the pre-emption theory 
(with respect to plant materials) excluded living matter from 
patentability.  The products of nature doctrine precluded 
patentability of materials existing in nature, including living 
matter.79  Under this doctrine, one could secure patents for 
fermentation processes and purified, naturally occurring chemical 
or biological compounds, as well as patents for microorganisms as 
a culture or in combination with a carrier.80  The product claims for 
the microorganisms, however, were not patentable because they 
comprised living materialmicroorganisms. 
The PTO approached the patentability of plant and plant 
materials as well as animals and animal materials in a way 
analogous to judicial approaches to patents claiming living matter.  
For example, the PTO rejected a patent application for altered 
 
enacted. See, e.g., The Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998). See 
also Jennifer Cannon & Michelle Haas, The Human Cloning Prohibition Act: Did 
Congress Go Too Far?, 35 HARV. J. LEGIS. 637, 638 (1998) (critiquing S. 1601 because 
it ignored important procedural safeguards, employed vague statutory language, and 
created a bill with significantly adverse implications).  On July 31, 2001, the House 
Judiciary Committee passed the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 
107th Cong., H.R. REP. NO. 172, at 1 (2001) [hereinafter HCPA].  The HCPA must still 
pass the Senate and the President must sign it, and it does not necessarily determine PTO 
policy regarding patentability of biotechnological processes and products. See Tol-O-
Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (reasoning that the PTO employs a broad definition of patentability and will 
issue a patent if the invention is not frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, 
or good morals of society).  This determination is related to the interpretation of the 
beneficial utility requirement of the invention.  See MERGES, supra note 52, at 189. 
79 See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 115 (noting that courts have interpreted the 
doctrine as an inquiry into whether a naturally occurring product has been changed or 
altered to the extent that the claimed form d[oes] not exist in nature); Robert A. 
Armitage, The Emerging U.S. Patent Law for the Protection of Biotechnology Research 
Results, 1989 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 47. Cf. David Scalise & Daniel Nugent, 
Patenting Living Matter in the European Community: Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16 
FORDHAM INTL L.J. 990, 1028 n.176 (stating that the products of nature doctrine denies 
patentability of things already existing in nature). 
80 VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 114. See also Morin, supra note 69, at 147.  Louis 
Pasteur obtained a patent for a culture of yeast in 1873. U.S. Patent No. 141,072 (issued 
May 9, 1873). 
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plant material because the subject matter consisted of nothing more 
than a combination of several products of nature.81  With respect to 
animals, it rejected the patent application for shrimps in which the 
head and the digestive organs were removed.82  Alterations that 
were not considered sufficiently permanent were not patentable.83  
The nonpatentability of plants was also related to the pre-emption 
theory derived from the existing Plant Patent Act and the Plant 
Variety Protection Act.84  The pre-emption theory precluded the 
patentability of plant varieties, plants, and partial plant materials 
such as cellswhen used to breed new plant varieties.  Each act 
protects particular plant varieties.  The Plant Patent Act covers 
asexually produced plants, including cultivated mutants and 
hybrids.  The Plant Variety Protection Act covers sexually 
produced plants, including seed-bearing plants, but not fungi and 
hybrids.85 
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,86 the U.S. Supreme Court 
narrowed the products of nature doctrine, thereby broadening the 
definition of patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the 
Act.87  Chakrabarty involved the patentability of altered 
microorganisms (the bacterium from the genus Pseudemonas), 
 
81 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 12930 (1948) (rejecting 
an application for patent claiming mixture of bacterial strains which used to infect plant 
roots, thereby contributing to the plants production of nitrogen). 
82 See WADDEL A. BIGGARD, PROSECUTION OF U.S. BIOTECHNOLOGICAL RELATED 
PATENT APPLICATIONS 17 (1985). 
83 VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 115. 
84 35 U.S.C. §§ 161164 (2000); 7 U.S.C. §§ 23212583 (2000). 
85 See generally GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE, PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
INVENTIONS (1996) (discussing legal protection of plants and plant materials). MERGES, 
supra note 62, at 15770 (reviewing the various approaches to be taken to 
(non)protection for plants and plant materials and noting that the preclusion of 
patentability of plant varieties and related materials cannot be based on referenced acts or 
their legislative history). Section 101 of the Act does not justify preclusion of 
patentability. Moreover, preclusion does not derive from the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter 
UPOV], because the U.S. made reservations to article 2(1) of that treaty.  More 
importantly, the UPOV is an executive agreement that has not been ratified by the Senate. 
Section 101 of the Act seems to override it. The PTO however, has taken a somewhat 
different stance possibly contrary to the Supreme Courts determination in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See MERGES, supra note 62, at 131. 
86 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
87 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
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which contained two plasmids that had been genetically modified 
to provide a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway.  The 
invention provided for a bacterium capable of breaking down 
multiple components of crude oil.88  The Court concluded that the 
bacterium was human-made instead of a products of nature and 
was, therefore, patentable as a manufacture or a composition of 
matter.89  In reaching this decision, the Court determined that 
Congress intended section 101 of the Act to encompass anything 
under the sun that is made by man.90  Accordingly, the distinction 
under section 101 of the Act is not between living and nonliving 
materials, but between human-made and non-human-made 
(natural) materials.91  The Court further reasoned that patent law 
practice may protect inventions that Congress did not foresee at the 
time the statute was enacted.92 
Courts should be wary of excluding subject matter because 
exclusion should be left to Congress.93  In Ex parte Hibberd,94 the 
PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) further 
expanded the definition of patentable subject matter under section 
101 of the Act.  Hibberd involved the patentability of plants and 
plant materialsentire plants and tissue cultures of maize plant 
cells with an increased content of the amino acid tryptophan.  This 
invention produced a high level of amino acids.  The BPAI relied 
on Chakrabarty to find that the Plant Patent Act and the Plant 
Variety Protection Act do not narrow the scope of patentable 
subject matter under section 101 of the Act.95  According to the 
 
88 Chakrabarty, 407 U.S. at 305. 
89 Id. at 307, 310. 
90 Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)). 
91 Id. at 313. 
92 Id. at 313. But see id. at 31417 (not directly responding to the argument that 
Congress failed to foresee genetic technology when it enacted section 101). 
93 Id. at 31518 (adding that section 101 of the Act does not explicitly exclude 
genetically modified organisms, whereas it has explicitly excluded other inventions such 
as those useful only in the utilization of nuclear material). 
94 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (BPAI 1985).  
95 Id. at 444 (reasoning that the pre-emption of the lex specialis and the lex generalis 
applies only if the two are contradictory or irreconcilable); see also id. at 446 
(determining that such was not the case here). 
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BPAI, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants  (UPOV) does not alter the scope of section 101, either.96 
2. Patents Granted 
In Ex parte Allen, the BPAI essentially accepted the 
patentability of animal subject matter.97  Allen involved product-
by-process claims to hydrostatically altered Pacific polypoid 
oysters, which grew larger than normal oysters.98  The examiner 
rejected the application on the grounds that (a) the polypoid oysters 
were living organisms and thereby fell outside the patent statutes 
scope, and (b) the oysters were obvious because they did not 
sufficiently differ from those produced by other known means.99  
The BPAI reversed the examiners determination that the oysters 
fell outside the scope of section 101.  It relied on Chakrabartys 
holding that the Plant Patent Act encompasses human-made life 
forms and, therefore, reasoned that the polypoid oysters were 
nonnaturally occurring.  The PTO has confirmed the Allen decision 
with respect to the patentability of the oysters and stated that: 
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-
naturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living 
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject 
matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C.  101 [sic] . . . .  The 
Boards decision does not affect the principle and practise 
that products found in nature will not be considered to be 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.  101 and/or 102 
[sic].  An article of manufacture or composition of matter 
occurring in nature will not be considered patentable unless 
given a new form, quality, properties, or combination not 
present in the original article.100 
 
96 Id. at 447.  See also MERGES, supra note 52, at 15770 (noting the preclusion of 
patentability of plant varieties and related materials cannot be based on referenced acts 
nor their legislative history). 
97 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (BPAI 1987), affd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
98 Id. at 142627. 
99 Id. at 1426. 
100 PTO Notice, supra note 77, at 24 (explicitly excluding human beings from patentable 
subject matter and stating that [a] claim directed to or including within its scope a 
human being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. [§] 
101). The PTO bars the issue of patents claiming human-based inventions because of its 
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In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, animal rights groups 
and farmers unsuccessfully challenged the PTOs rule on both 
procedural and substantive grounds.101  The plaintiffs argued that 
the rule should have been published in the Federal Register 
pursuant to section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and that the PTO should have invited the public for 
comment.  Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that the PTO had no 
statutory authority to define the scope of patentable subject matter.  
The plaintiffs sought a court declaration that animals are not 
patentable subject matter.  The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California rejected these assertions and held that the rule 
was an interpretation of prior decisional precedent and, therefore, 
not the result of substantive rulemaking.  It was an interpretative 
rule not subject to APA notice and comment requirements.102  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal and determined that the animal 
rights groups and farmers lacked standing.103  It, therefore, did not 
address the substantive issue of whether transgenic animals should 
be patentable.104 
After issuing its rule, the PTO placed an eight-month 
moratorium on further animal patents to allow Congress time to 
 
interpretation of patent law and its reliance on the 13th Amendment of the Constitution. 
Scholars and judges have criticized this approach. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990) (illustrating a patent on a human cell line); James P. Daniel, Of 
Mice and Manimal: The Patent & Trademark Offices Latest Stance Against Patent 
Protection for Human-Based Inventions, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 11618 (1999); Jagels, 
supra note 77, at 136; Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal 
Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 448 (1999). 
101 710 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Morin, supra note 69, at 15657. 
102 Animal Legal Def. Fund., 701 F. Supp. at 73132 (deciding that a PTO rule was 
interpretive because it clarified prior cases such as Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1425, 1427 (BPAI 1987), affd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and Ex parte Hibberd, 227 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (BPAI 1985)). 
103 The case first went up to the Ninth Circuit, who determined that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the case. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 900 F.2d 195, 197 
(9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that [t]he complaint squarely raises the question of whether 
the Patent Act allows the Commissioner to authorize the patenting of animals . . . [t]he 
answer to this question turns on a construction of patent law and arises under the patent 
law).  The case was then transferred to the Federal Circuit. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
104 Elizabeth J. Hecht, Note: Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The 
Controversy Over Trangenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1060 
(1992). 
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debate the various issues involved in patenting animals.105  At the 
end of the moratorium, the PTO issued the first patent claiming a 
genetically modified animal, the Harvard mouse.106  Insofar as 
relevant here, the claims read: 
1.  A transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ 
cells and somatic cells contain a recombinant activated 
oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an 
ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage . . . . 
. . . . 
11.  The mammal of claim 1, said mammal being a rodent. 
12.  The mammal of claim 11, said rodent being a mouse.107 
The transgenic mice, intended for research, had an increased 
susceptibility to breast cancer.  The patent covers not only the 
original transgenic mice, but also their progeny and any mammal 
bearing the inserted oncogene sequence.  The patent claims include 
the animals containing the oncogene because the gene is expressed 
in the phenotype of the animal.108  The use of this oncogene in 
another mammal arguably constitutes patent infringement.  The 
scope of the patent is based partially on the reproductive capacity 
of animals, thus ensuring production of the invention, one of the 
patentees rights.  On the other hand, its scope is also based on the 
assumption that this invention applies to all mammals, including 
human beings, which are excluded from the claim because of their 
non-patentability as such.109 
 
105 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 888, at 27172 (1988). 
106 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988) [hereinafter Harvard mouse 
patent]. 
107 Id. 
108 The term phenotype refers to the visible or otherwise measurable physical and 
biochemical characteristics of an organism resulting from the interaction of genotype and 
environment. STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1071 (24th ed. 1982).  The term 
genotype refers to the precise genetic constitution of an organism. Id. at 581. 
109 See J.H. STEK, OCTROOIRECHT EN TRANSGENE DIEREN [PATENT LAW AND 
TRANSGENIC ANIMALS] 6465 (1991); VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 355; Moga, 
supra note 46, at 519; Morin, supra note 69, at 15859. 
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Since the Harvard mouse patent, the PTO has granted 
numerous patents for transgenic animals.110  Most product patents 
encompass only the genetically modified animals that carry the 
particular feature in their genotype.111  The scope of these patents 
is restricted to the animals that were used by the inventor, and thus 
belonging to one race.112  Other patents have a broader scope, 
 
110 It would fall outside the scope of this article to review all of the patents granted for 
transgenic animals after issuance of the Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106.  The 
review is, therefore, limited. 
111 Some of the illustrated patents also encompass processes, which, due to scope, are 
omitted here. 
112 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,156,952 (issued Dec. 5, 2000) claiming a transgenic rat 
whose genome contains at least one copy of a human immunodeficiency virus type 1 . . . 
DNA . . . said rat develops at least one symptom of . . . AIDS) (emphasis added) (partial 
claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,981,830 (issued Nov. 9, 1999) (claiming a transgenic mouse, 
whose genome comprises a homozygous disruption of the endogenous hepsin 
gene. . .said disruption results in said mouse exhibiting elevated blood serum alkaline 
phosphatase levels . . . .) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,625,126 
(issued Apr. 29, 1997) (claiming a transgenic mouse containing in its genome a 
transgene comprising in operable linkage a plurality of human V genes . . . in response to 
antigenic stimulation) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,602,309 
(issued Feb. 11, 1997) (claiming a  transgenic mouse whose somatic and germ cells 
contain and express a gene coding for mouse nerve growth factor, said mouse exhibiting 
hyperinnervation when compared to a normal mouse, and said gene having been 
introduced into fertilized mouse embryo) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent 
No. 5,591,669 (issued Jan. 7, 1997) (claiming a  transgenic mouse having a phenotype 
characterized by a disruption of the . . . endogenous heavy chain and an absence of 
plasma B cells producing naturally occurring mouse antibodies) (emphasis added) 
(partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,434,340 (issued July 18, 1995) (claiming a transgenic 
mouse having a phenotype characterized by the substantial absence of mature T-cells 
otherwise naturally occurring in said mouse . . . being incapable of mediating T-cell 
maturation in said transgenic mouse) (emphasis added) (partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 
5,387,742 (issued Feb. 7, 1995) (claiming a transgenic mouse whose cells contain a 
DNA sequence, comprising . . . [a] nerve tissue specific promotor; and a DNA 
sequence . . . wherein the promotor and DNA sequence. . . are operatively linked . . . and 
integrated in the genome of the mouse and expressed) (emphasis added) (partial claim); 
U.S. Patent No. 5,183,949 (issued Feb. 2, 1993) (claiming an animal produced by the 
injection of human T-cells infected in vitro with HIV-1 leading to rabbit model for 
testing anti-AIDS therapeutic agents, vaccines, and HIV-1 infection) (emphasis added) 
(partial claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,385 (issued Dec. 29, 1992) (claiming a virus 
resistant mouse, prepared by introduction of a gene encoding a human interferon having a 
antiviral activity into a host mouse); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,385 (issued Dec. 29, 1992) 
(claiming a virus resistant mouse, prepared by introduction of a gene encoding a human 
interferon having a antiviral activity into a host mouse); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,383 
(issued Dec. 29, 1992) (defining an animal containing a recombinant gene that is capable 
of promoting as benign prostatic hyperplasia or hypertrophy in said transgenic mouse) 
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however, encompassing not only the animals wherein the genetic 
modification occurred, but also the animals offspring and/or 
animals of different races and/or higher taxonomical units, such as 
species.  Broad patents were, among others, granted for: 
• transgenic mouse offspring produced by the mating of a 
first transgenic mouse carrying a transresponder 
transgene whose expression is regulated by a viral gene 
product of HbV-1 and a second transgenic mouse 
carrying a transactivator transgene;113 
• [a t]ransgenic mouse or the progeny thereof whose 
somatic and germline cells contain a stably integrated 
DNA sequence selected from the . . . rat AGP gene 
which is expressed in the mouse to produce rat alpha-1-
acid glycoprotein;114 
• [a] transgenic non-human mammal whose genome 
comprises DNA construct comprising. . .a rabbit WAP 
promotor. . .said mammal expresses said DNA 
sequence such that a recoverable amount of. . .protein is 
produced in the milk of said mammal;115 
• a non-human mammal, a mouse in particular . . . 
wherein the . . . Kir6.2 gene . . . essential for insulin 
secretion . . .is lost . . . ;116 [and] 
• a transgenic rodent, comprising amyloid plaques in its 
brain tissue . . . said rodent has at least 50% increase in 
the number of amyloid plaques compared to . . . a 
control rodent . . . .117 
 
(emphasis added); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,384 (issued Dec. 29, 1992) (describing an 
immune-deficient mouse characterized by the substantial absence of mature T-cells 
otherwise naturally occurring in said mouse) (emphasis added); Kluth, The Evolution of 
Patents on Life: Transgenic Animals, Clones and Stem Cells, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOCY 830, 833 (2001) (discussing the claims in the 383 and 384 patents). 
113 U.S. Patent No. 5,221,778 (issued June 22, 1993) (emphasis added) (partial claim). 
114 U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (issued July 15, 1997) (emphasis added) (partial claim). 
115 U.S. Patent No. 5,965,788 (issued Oct. 12, 1999) (emphasis added) (partial claim). 
116 U.S. Patent No. 6,194,634 (issued Feb. 27, 2001) (emphasis added) (partial claim). 
117 U.S. Patent No. 6,172,277 (issued Jan. 9, 2001) (emphasis added) (partial claim). 
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Most of the patents granted after 1988, however, have a more 
limited scope than the patent granted in Harvard mouse.118  As 
described, claim 1 of the Harvard mouse patent extends to all non-
human mammals having the particular genetic featurethereby 
comprising the entire zoological class mammalia, except human 
beings.119  Claims 11 and 12 of the patent encompass rodents 
(order Rodentia) and mice (race).120  In general, one could 
conclude that patents granted after 1988 chiefly encompass 
particular animals (a variety of a particular race), and no longer 
embrace entire (sub)classes or orders.121  Only a few patents 
extend, or appear to extend, to higher taxonomical units such as 
 
118 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,191,342 (issued Feb. 20, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 
6,187,993 (issued Feb. 13, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,166,289 (issued Dec. 26, 2000); U.S. 
Patent No. 6,136,040 (issued Oct. 24, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 5,859,312 (issued Jan. 12, 
1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,631,407 (issued May 20, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,663,482 
(issued Sept. 2, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,661,016 (issued Aug. 26, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 
5,550,316 (issued Aug. 27, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,530,179 (issued June 25, 1996); 
supra note 112. 
119 See HENDERSONS DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGICAL TERMS 580 (9th ed. 1982); LYNN 
MARGULIS & KARLENE V. SCHWARTZ, FIVE KINGDOMS: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE 
PHYLA OF LIFE ON EARTH (1st ed. 1982).  That insertion and expression of an oncogene is 
a particular variety of mice has succeeded does not necessarily mean that this will also be 
possible in other mammals.  Whereas this process may be performed on the animals of 
one race (mice) or the animals of a same species (rodents), such is likely not to be 
performed, without further and possibly significant adaptation of the process, on animals 
of other taxonomic (sub)orders.  These animals differ largely in genotype.  The manner of 
expression of strange genetic material in an animal, and the extent to which it will 
thereby contribute to development of certain characteristicsin case of the Harvard 
mouse patent, development of certain cancersdepends on the entire biochemical 
context of the animal concerned.  The complete or incomplete transcription and 
translation of a gene depends on its location on the chromosome and the manner in which 
the functions of the codons are performed within the cells.  Genes could, therefore, 
operate in a variety of ways in different genetic contexts, e.g., in similar but genetically 
differing animals.  In view hereof, one should not lightly assume that the inventions 
concerned can be performed in all animals of different zoological subclasses and orders.  
Such may be problematic in view of the enablement requirement of section 112 of the 
Act. See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 34548; Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at 984. 
120 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). 
121 See supra note 112. 
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classes or orders.122  Some patents have been granted for the 
modified animals themselves, as well as their natural offspring.123 
This bears significance because, although the offspring will 
reveal the particular genetic feature created by the invention, the 
offspring does not derive alone from technology.  In fact, the 
offsprings existence apparently results from a natural process and 
is excluded from patentability under the laws of nature and/or 
products of nature doctrines.124 
Notwithstanding this broad construction of patent scope, there 
has been a general narrowing in the scope of patentable subject 
matter.  This may stem from the increased level of skill of the 
patent examiners.  At the time the Harvard mouse patent was 
issued, PTO examiners had relatively little skill in reviewing 
applications for patents claiming animal biotechnological 
inventions.  Examiners relied heavily on information the applicants 
provided, but they had an incentive to acquire the broadest patent 
possible.  The present examiners have more experience and, 
therefore, better insight into the specifications, limitations, and 
realistic applications of the inventions concerned.125 
3. Issues Reviewed 
a) Novelty and Nonobviousness 
The patentability of genetically altered animals may be 
problematic in view of the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements of sections 101, 102, and 103 of the Act.  While most 
of the referenced patented animals underwent minor changes and, 
for the most part, pre-existed naturally, the patents granted for 
them extended to the entire animal.  In principle, this broad scope 
derived from the characteristics of the inventions involved and the 
 
122 See supra notes 115117 and accompanying text (including nonhuman mammals 
and rodents). 
123 See supra notes 113114 and accompanying text (including transgenic mouse 
offspring produced by the mating and their progeny).  The 597 patent, supra note 
114, does not specify whether also naturally produced progeny is encompassed. 
However, this may be suggested for the broad description of the particular claim. 
124 See supra Part II.C. 
125 Moga, supra note 46, at 521. 
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environments in which they operated.  Inventions such as insertion 
and expression of genes cannot be separated from their entire 
influence on the geno- and phenotype of the animal.  After Allen 
and the Harvard mouse patent, the PTO considered the entire 
genome of the modified animals concerned different enough to be 
novel.  From a comparative standpoint, however, the genomes of 
non-modified mice may not differ substantially from the genomes 
of the transgenic one.126 
The nonobviousness requirement may also impose a burden on 
the patentability of transgenic animals.  In 1995, Congress 
amended this requirement to accommodate biotechnological 
developments.127  As amended, section 103(b) provides that, under 
 
126 See Hofmeyer, supra note 73, at 98990.  On this ground, the Trial Division of the 
Canadian Federal Court denied the patent application for the Harvard mouse (Patent 
App. No. 484,723, denied August 4, 1995).  The Commissioner ruled that claims 
covering a transgenic non-human mammal were not patentable subject matter under 
Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. P-4, § 2 (2001) (Can.), but approved the issue of 
patents covering the method and use claims.  This decision is not published. See Morin, 
supra note 69, at 147 n.3. 
 The Canadian Federal Court also denied the application insofar as it covered the 
transgenic mice as such in President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [1998] 3 F.C. 510, 525, revd, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.). See 
id. paras. 2324 (A mouse is a complex life form and thus there are many features of the 
mice which are not under the control of the inventors.  They have created a method to 
inject eggs with a myc gene but they have not invented the mouse.  It is not necessary for 
the inventor to directly control all aspects of the natural process leading to the creation of 
the end product. . . .  However, the ultimate product which will result from the process is 
completely unknown and unknowable. . . .  On even the broadest interpretation I cannot 
find that a mouse is raw material which was given new qualities from the inventor. 
Certainly the presence of the myc gene is new, but the mouse is not new . . . .  [T]here is 
no way to separate the transgene from the rest of the mouse once it is introduced and 
everything else about the mouse is present completely independently of human 
intervention.).  Whereas the inseparability of the transgene and the animals may be 
regarded a reason in the U.S. to grant patents, it is a reason not to grant them in Canada.  
Clearly, the balance is struck differently in the U.S. and Canada. See Morin, supra note 
69, at 197 (arguing that the Canadian Intellectual Property Office should follow the more 
liberal U.S. approach). The review of the same application before the European Patent 
Office (EPO) is discussed in Chapter III. 
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000). 
(1) [A] biotechnological process using or resulting in a composition of matter 
that is novel under section 102 . . . and nonobvious under section (a) of this 
section shall be considered nonobvious if 
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certain formalistic requirements: 1) a process may be classified as 
nonobvious if the resulting or used composition of matter is novel 
and nonobvious and 2) a composition of matter used in or 
produced by a patented biotechnological process shall also be 
covered by such patent.  The first requirement fails to indicate the 
nonobviousness of a process or shed any light on the standard for 
novelty and nonobviousness of transgenic animals.  The second 
requirement specifies the general approach to product-by-processes 
for biotechnological composition of matter.128  Furthermore, it 
allows for the patenting of genes used in the application of 
patented biotechnological processes.129 
The amendment of section 103 of the Act eases the 
patentability of biotechnological inventions, whether they are 
processes or products.  Amended section 103, however, does not 
 
(A) claims to the process and composition of matter are contained in either 
the same application for patent or in separate applications having the same 
effective filing date; and 
(B) the composition of matter, and the process at the time it was invented, 
were owned by the same person . . . . 
(2) A patent issued on a process under paragraph (1) 
(A) shall also contain the claims to the composition of matter used in or 
made by that process . . . . 
(3) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term biotechnological process means- 
(A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or 
multi-celled organism to 
(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence, 
(ii) inhibit . . . or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide 
sequence, or 
(iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally 
associated with said organism; 
(B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific 
protein, such as a monoclonal antibody; and 
(C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by 
subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B). 
Id. (emphasis added). See also VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 272304; Walter, supra 
note 46, at 103940. 
128 Eight years before the amendment, in Allen, the BPAI held that if the product in a 
product-by-process claim is the same as a product in the prior art, or is obvious in view 
thereof, it could not be patented, even if the process was novel and nonobvious. Ex parte 
Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427 (BPAI 1987), affd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
see also VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 305 (noting that the amendment removes a 
restriction to patentability of said products). 
129 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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directly focus on the patentability of transgenic animals as such.130  
In view of the PTOs relatively low standard for novelty and 
nonobviousness, as illustrated by the referenced animal patents, the 
PTO will likely consider many similar processes to be nonobvious.  
The product-by-process animals derived from these techniques 
subsequently enable patentability of animals and other products.131  
Because of these formalistic requirements, however, section 103s 
overall impact is quite modest.132 
b) Products of Nature 
The products of nature doctrine has a very restrictive 
application, under which anything under the sun that is made by 
man is considered patentable subject matter.133  Anything that 
does not occur naturally without the interference of man, whether 
almost insignificant or more influential, is considered to be made 
by man according to the PTO and some courts.134  Even with this 
restrictive interpretation of what constitutes a natural product, 
however, one may doubt whether the broad scope of some of the 
patents granted by the PTO for transgenic animals, which in 
certain instances covers the offspring, is defensible.135  The 
offspring cannot be considered to be products-by-process in the 
 
130 See MERGES, supra note 62, at 602. 
131 Many identical technologies (methods and processes) are used by biotechnologists in 
an identical manner but on different subjects and biological materials. See Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721, 73536 (1990).  One may 
doubt whether the animal may be regarded as the product-by-process. Clearly, the entire 
animal (or most of it and its features) does not exist because of the isolated application of 
the processthe insertion of the transgene. Cf. Joshua V. Funder, Rethinking Patents for 
Plant Innovation, 21 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 551, 568 (1999) ([A]s yet no human 
is able to re-create a living organism from its constituent components . . . .  [O]ur 
inability to reproduce life suggests that claiming the whole organism . . . on the basis of 
altering several biological processes may not yet be justified.). 
132 MERGES, supra note 62, at 602.  For example, the product and process need to be 
developed by the same firm or group. 
133 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
134 Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (BPAI 1987), affd, 846 F.2d 77 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
135 See Funder, supra note 131, at 56768; U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (issued July 15, 
1997) (progeny); U.S. Patent No. 5,221,778 (issued June 22, 1993) (offspring . . . by 
mating); U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988) (ancestor); Hofmeyer, 
supra note 74, at 986. 
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sense that the initial process, the insertion and expression of the 
gene in the original animal, was not carried out on them by the 
inventor.  The offspring may be products-by-process if they have 
been cloned.  As the products of natural reproduction, most of the 
offspring referred to in referenced animal patents cannot be 
products-by-process, since the natural process of mating is 
excluded from patentability under the laws of nature doctrine.  
Consequently, the products of such a process can only be 
patentable if they are novel and nonobvious manufactures or 
compositions of matter that do not occur in nature absent active 
human intervention.  In view of the restrictive application of the 
products of nature doctrine, one may also argue, however, that if 
there was at least some human intervention in the natural process 
(e.g., if that process occurred in vitro) a broad patent scope may be 
justified. 
c) Utility 
Pursuant to section 101 of the Act, an invention must satisfy a 
three-pronged test of utility.  First, it must have general utility 
(capable of use); second, specific utility (solve problem it was 
made for); and, third, beneficial utility (not only harmful for 
society).136  The general utility prong will usually not create any 
problems for the biotechnological inventions concerned.  
Transgenic animals are generally considered useful by medical 
researchers, and most have some practical utility, thereby 
satisfying the requisite level of general utility.137  Moreover, the 
utility requirement does not require proof of the inventions 
usefulness; a general proposed use, which the inventors seemingly 
always have in mind, suffices.138 
Biotechnological inventions may not satisfy the second prong 
of the test, however, due to their lack of specific utility.  If the PTO 
applied the utility requirement in a strict manner, many potential 
biotechnological inventions may never be patented.  For example, 
the expression of an inserted gene is unpredictable and there is a 
 
136 MERGES, supra note 62, at 189. 
137 See Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at 987; Moga, supra note 46, at 52542; Walter, supra 
note 46, at 1038. 
138 Walter, supra note 46, at 1038. 
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substantial likelihood that it will not succeed.  A skilled person in 
the art may not be willing to accept certain in vivo tests as 
predictive models of utility against development of particular 
features.139  The same applies to the specific utility of transgenic 
animals to be used as research models, i.e., to analyze the 
development of a certain illness or to experiment with a medicinal 
or other treatment, as was the purported utility of the Harvard 
mouse.140  Strict interpretation of this prong of the utility 
requirement may especially hamper smaller biotechnological 
companies or less wealthy inventors who lack the financial means 
to provide excessive clinical data to prove the specific utility of the 
invention.  Furthermore, because the invention is not yet patented, 
these small companies cannot raise the funds necessary for more 
extensive testing.141  Recently, however, the PTO and courts have 
moved away from the traditional strict approach.  Currently, the 
PTO initially assumes that an invention, for which a patent 
application is filed, has specific utility.  The PTO has the initial 
burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility 
in the disclosure.142  Only when the PTO provides evidence 
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably 
doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the patent 
applicant to provide additional evidence.143  In 1995, the PTO 
issued special examiner guidelines for biotechnology 
applications.144  These guidelines have undergone certain changes 
and the PTO issued the most recent guidelines in January 2001.145  
The guidelines state that if an applicant has asserted that an 
 
139 See, e.g., Ex parte Aggerwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 1338 (BPAI 1992) 
([T]here is considerable doubt that those skilled in the art would be willing to accept 
appellants in vitro tests and in vivo tests as established models predictive of utility 
against tumors in humans.). 
140 See supra note 38. 
141 VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 338. 
142 In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
143 In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
144 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995) (partially following the decisions in Marzocchi 
and Bundy). 
145 66 Fed. Reg. 4 (Jan. 5, 2001) (amending 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440 (Dec. 21, 1999), 
corrected at 65 Fed. Reg. 3,425 (Jan. 21, 2000)).  See also Julian David Forman, A 
Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnology Patent Applications, 12 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 65457 (2002) (finding the guidelines of Jan. 5, 2001 more 
stringent than the previous guidelines). 
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invention is useful for any particular purpose, and if this assertion 
would be considered to be credible by the skilled person, the 
examiner should not reject the patent because of lack of utility 
(thereby combining the two prongs of general and specific utility).  
The examiner assesses credibility from the perspective of one of 
ordinary skill in the art in view of any evidence of record that is 
relevant to the assertions.  The PTO considers evidence of experts, 
prior art, test results, and publications of all sorts.  Data derived 
from in vitro testing may support an applicants assertions towards 
in vivo application.146  In view of the applicable utility 
examination guideline, one may conclude that the special utility 
prong of the utility requirement of section 101 of the Act will not 
be a substantial hurdle for an applicant seeking a patent covering a 
transgenic animal. 
The third prong of the utility requirement of section 101 of the 
Act, the beneficial utility requirement, may have a particular 
meaning when discussing animal biotechnological inventions.  
Courts have invoked this prong to deny patentability for immoral 
subject matter, e.g., with respect to gambling devices.147  
Beneficial utility has also barred patentability of inventions that 
were only useful for immoral purposes.148  This utility requirement 
may bar two types of inventions: inventions that are used to 
deceive or commit fraud and those that are frowned upon by 
society at large.  In principle, biotechnological inventions are not 
 
146 See supra note 144; In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
147 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (holding 
that an invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or 
sound morals of society; an invention that is mischievous or immoral, such as one to 
poison people or to facilitate private assassination, is not useful). 
148 See, e.g., Chi. Patent Corp. v. Genco, 124 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1941) (granting 
patent but distinguishing between game of pinball and gambling product whose sole use 
is as gambling apparatus); Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1900) 
(invalidating a patent for invention that produced artificial spots on domestic tobacco 
because it was deceptive and lacked utility); Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp. 
640, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1936) (denying patent for vending machine that was a game of 
chance); Natl Automatic Device Corp. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889) 
(denying a patent for a toy horse course because product could be used as a gambling 
device); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (denying a patent for return 
device for coins for machines that were operated with coins because product could be 
used as a gambling device). 
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used to commit fraud or to deceive.149  Society may, however, 
frown upon them.150 
The present status of the third prong of the utility test, 
beneficial utility, is not unequivocal.  In 1977, the BPAI ended the 
nonpatentability of gambling devices, and de facto prohibition, 
based on lack of beneficial utility.151  The PTO and courts have not 
unequivocally rejected the application of the beneficial utility 
requirement as such.  A U.S.  District Court explicitly rejected the 
doctrine in Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics Inc.152  The Whistler 
court held that Congress should amend the patent law if it 
preferred to bar patentability of radar detectors to evade speed limit 
enforcement.153  Alternatively, the Federal Circuits decision in 
Tol-o-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft 
may provide a basis for more frequent invocation of the doctrine 
by the PTO and courts.154  It embraced the beneficial utility 
doctrine, although it did not find it applicable to the case at 
hand.155  If the PTO and courts were willing to apply the beneficial 
utility requirement on a case-by-case basis, they could do so by 
balancing the immoral uses of the inventions with the moral 
ones.156  With respect to chimaeras, the PTO has announced that 
 
149 However, in a stretch of the mind, one could imagine that genetic modifications 
could lead to deceit on descent of animals and animal materials, e.g., for commercial 
agricultural purposes. 
150 Magnani, supra note 100, at 45354. 
151 Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (BPAI 1977). 
152 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (N.D. Tex. 1988). 
153 Id. at 1886. 
154 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the applicable standard of utility and 
repeatedly referring to Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. at 1018). 
155 Compare Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1548 (finding a patent on a rodless pistol cylinder 
not invalid for lack of beneficial utility), with Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 52 
F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (not invoking beneficial utility). But see Magnani, supra note 
100, at 453 (suggesting that the extensive reference to the doctrine shows that the Federal 
Circuit is laying groundwork for future invocation of the doctrine). 
156 E.g., In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178 (C.C.P.A. 1960). See also Robert P. Merges, 
Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial 
Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (1988) (suggesting that courts may be willing 
to balance these features of a particular invention in determining utility). This approach 
aligns with the deontological theory of ethics that provides for ethical rules to 
determine under which circumstances certain actions may be taken. The deontological 
approach provides for a balancing inquiry. Other theories are the virtue theory that 
relies on absolute normative principles, and the consequentalist theory that focuses on 
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inventions directed to human/non-human chimaeras may not be 
patentable where they fail to meet the public policy and morality 
aspects of the utility requirement.157  The PTOs position supports 
the invocation of the beneficial utility requirement with respect to 
transgenic animals that contain human material.  The basis for the 
distinction between human/animal chimaeras and animal/animal 
chimaeras is however, unclear.158  The definition of what 
constitutes a human versus an animal is also unclear.159  Due 
to the lack of clarity between what constitutes a human and an 
animal and the generally restrictive application of the doctrine in 
recent cases, one may doubt whether a rejection of a patent 
application for lack of beneficial utility will stand on appeal.160 
Legal scholars widely reject application of the beneficial utility 
doctrine when discussing the patentability of transgenic animals.161  
 
the consequences of acts and their (un)ethical nature. See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, 
at 7072; Morin, supra note 69, at 168; Schrecker, Different Philosophies on the Ethics 
of Patenting Higher Life Forms, 17:4 POLY OPTIONS 18, 19 (1996).  Another theoretical 
division is offered by Dr. Verhoogh in his research for The Institute of Theoretical 
Biology of the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. See LINSKENS VERHOOGH, HET 
MAAKBARE DIER EN TRANSGENE DIEREN [THE FABRICATED ANIMAL AND TRANSGENIC 
ANIMALS] (1990). Verhoogh identifies four theories: (1) preference-ulitarism (all living 
creatures are in principle of equal value, but fundamental interests of one should be 
protected if this will only result in damage to non-fundamental interests of the other); (2) 
two-factor egalitarianism (creatures with a higher and more complex psychological 
capacity are of more value); (3) theory of law (all creatures are of equal value, but the 
interests of one group may be sacrificed for the interests of another group); and (4) theory 
of respect for nature (biocentrism, all creatures are of equal value).  Clearly, the PTO and 
Congress follow the two-factor egalitarianism theory. See generally W.J.M. Heijs & 
C.J.H. Midden, Biotechnology, Attitudes and Influencing Factors: Summary Report 1 
(1996) (reviewing the various ethical principles and approaches). 
157 D.J. Quigg, Media Advisory Statement by Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 
Patent and Trademark Office Issues, Statement on Patenting of Partial Human Life 
Forms, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17 (1988). But see Jasmine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of 
Biotechnological Inventions in the U.S., Europe and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is 
Public Policy, 34 GEO. WASH. INTL L. REV. 223, 242 (2002) (indicating that it would be 
hard to refuse protection for human/animal chimaeras based on the PTOs policy). 
158 Daniel, supra note 100, at 119. 
159 See Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 
201 (1996); Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures 
Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 47780 (1989). 
160 See Magnani, supra note 100, at 45455. 
161 See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 100, at 125 (arguing that the PTO is not suited to make 
such determinations and that, if a moral bar should be raised, it must be done by 
Congress); Hecht, supra note 104, at 1057 (arguing that the patent system is neutral and 
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It appears as if the patentability of transgenic animals will not be 
restricted significantly by the beneficial utility requirement.  The 
large number of patents issued by the PTO in recent years for 
transgenic animals, including ones that carried one or more human 
transgenes, supports this conclusion.162  Thus, one may conclude 
that patentability of transgenic animals in the U.S. is based on 
principles of the virtue theory.163  The absolute principles applied 
encompass, for example, the principle that human beings are 
distinct from animals, the principle that human beings are more 
valuable than animals, and the principle that the rights of animals 
are subordinate to the rights of humans. 
d) Definitions of Species 
As discussed above, the distinction between what constitutes 
an animal and what constitutes a human being is unclear.  This 
distinction is critical because humans are not patentable subject 
matter.164  The PTOs recent statement that human/nonhuman 
chimaeras may lack beneficial utility under section 101 of the Act 
makes it clear that one must identify what is human and what is 
not.165  Absent clear zoological classification, legal scholars have 
 
is not suited to regulate the application of patented inventions; Congress could prohibit 
explicitly, but has decided not do so, and the risks of transgenic research are speculative 
and not direct and proven); Merges, supra note 156, at 106268 (noting that moral norms 
change over time and have no clear limits, while recognizing the role of patent law as a 
technologicalnot moralstimulator); Walter, supra note 46, at 104546 (arguing that 
it is inappropriate for the PTO to make far-reaching ethical decisions and that the possible 
ethical problems relate to biotechnology and not to the patenting of such and its 
products). But see VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36 (arguing that the patentee should have 
certainty about the possibility of exploitation of the invention); Peter Drahos, 
Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality, 21 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 441, 
448 (1999) (arguing that the important societal consequences of certain inventions call 
for a moral evaluation by patent offices of the inventions for which patents are sought). 
162 See supra notes 111, 115120; U.S. Patent No. 5,859,312 (issued Jan. 12, 1999) 
(transgenic animal having human transgenes); U.S. Patent No. 5,814,318 (issued Sept. 
29, 1998) (transgenic animal producing human antibodies); U.S. Patent No. 5,770,429 
(issued June 23, 1998) (transgenic animal producing human antibodies); U.S. Patent No. 
5, 625, 126 (issued Apr. 29, 1997) (transgenic animal producing human antibodies). 
163 See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 7072; Morin, supra note 69, at 168; 
Schrecker, supra note 156, at 19, and accompanying text. 
164 See supra note 77. 
165 See Quigg, supra note 157.  The need to phrase a concise definition is revealed by 
the filing of a test patent application for the product of the combination of human and 
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suggested that species may be distinguished by their ability to 
reason.166  The drawback to this approach, however, is it is difficult 
to quantify reasoning ability.167 
e) Enablement 
Pursuant to section 112 of the Act, the patent applicant must 
disclose his invention sufficiently to enable one skilled in the art to 
make and use the invention without undue experimentation.  If the 
invention cannot adequately be disclosed in the specifications 
(section 112) and/or drawing (section 113), it can be deposited 
(section 114).  Written and drawn disclosure can be problematic 
with inventions of genetic modification because the magnitude of 
an entire genomic region complicates ones ability to describe the 
effects of a genetically modified animal.168  For transgenic 
animals, however, even deposit does not solve this problem.169 
f) Third Party Interests 
Various third parties may be affected by patents claiming 
transgenic animals.  First, agricultural farmers may be affected.  
 
animal embryo cells to produce a single human/nonhuman chimera, allegedly on 
approximately a 50/50 basis. See Daniel, supra note 100, at 10001; Jagels, supra note 
77, at 11617; Magnani, supra note 100, at 446. 
166 See, e.g., Magnani, supra note 157, at 450. 
167 See Fishman, supra note 159, at 47880 (proposing a multi-prong test, based on 
certain geno- and phenotypical characteristics and/or the origin of species without regard 
to whether it was in vitro or in vivo); Ducor, supra note 159. 
168 See Akim F. Czmus, Biotechnology Protection in Japan, the European Community 
and the U.S., 8 TEMP. INTL & COMP. L.J. 435, 440 (1994); Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at 
991. 
169 The PTO permits patentees to deposit their inventions in places called depositaries.  
While deposit may often be sufficient to meet enablement requirements, it may be 
inappropriate for transgenic animals because deposit of an animal does not reveal the 
operable invention in the genome. See Hofmeyer, supra note 74, at 993.  Only deposit of 
particular material of the animal could sufficiently disclose the invention, but may not 
show the entire invention (both in geno- and phenotype). Joseph Straus, Ethische, 
rechtliche und wirtschaftliche Probleme des Patent und Sortenschutzes für die 
biotechnologische Tierzüchtung und Tierproduktion [The Ethical, Legal and Economic 
Problems of Patent and Species Protection for Biotechnological Animal Breeding and 
Animal Production] 39 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, 
INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INTL] 913 (1990). See also VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 
36, at 33945 (describing the enablement requirement in the context of animal material 
deposit). 
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The first sale doctrine implies that patents cannot restrict post-
sale activities.  The patentees right to limit sales ends when the 
patented product is sold.  It prevents purchasers down the 
distribution chain from being charged with infringement that grows 
out of a transaction further up the chain.170  The first sale doctrine 
is not generally applicable to a patented transgenic animal.  Due to 
reproductive capacities, animals reproduce without interference of 
the licensor or purchaser.  Patents for these animals may 
encompass animals of a certain race that have the particular feature 
or explicitly encompasses all direct progeny.171  Transgenic 
animals are especially attractive to farmers, due to their disease 
resistant qualities or greater productive capacities.172  Farmers with 
limited financial resources, however, may be disadvantaged by the 
present scope of transgenic animal patents.  Reproduction and use 
of the acquired transgenic animal by such farmers will constitute 
infringement.  Compensation to the patentee may take the form of 
damages after infringement has occurred or be added to the initial 
acquisition price.  Proposed legislation that would provide for a so-
called farmers exemption has not been enacted by Congress.173  A 
farmers exemption may not, however, be necessary.174  Note that 
U.S. patent law does not provide for compulsory licenses.175 
 
170 See Intel Corp. v. U.L.S.I. Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
171 See supra notes 112113. 
172 See infra Part C.13. 
173 In 1989, two bills were introduced that considered the position of farmers. H.R. 
1556, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1557, 101st Cong. (1989). These bills were similar to 
earlier attempts to create farmers exemptions. H.R. 4970, 100th Cong. (1988); H.R. 
4971, 100th Cong. (1988) (permitting farmers to reproduce patented animals during 
professional farming activities and allowing them to sell their offspring but prohibiting 
them from alienating germ cells, sperm, or embryos). See Hecht, supra note 104, at 
106367; Morin, supra note 69, at 19192. 
174 See Hecht, supra note 104, at 1073 (suggesting that patentees will not find it 
economically necessary to enforce their rights to the full extent and collect royalties); 
Walter, supra note 46, at 104142 (1998) (suggesting that the benefits of the transgenic 
animals will lower costs for farmers drastically, even if the higher acquisition prices and 
royalties are included and that inventors would, without patent protection, license out 
their animals more selectively.  This is based on the assumption that alternative legal 
instruments, like the general law of contracts, will not provide enough protection to the 
inventor. This assumption is reviewed and confirmed. CHRISTINE ENZING, OCTROOIERING 
VAN GENETISCH GEMODIFICEERDE DIEREN: FEITEN EN MENINGEN [PATENTABILITY OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ANIMALS: FACTS AND OPINIONS] 21 (1991)). See also Eckehart 
Von Pechmann, Ist der Ausschluss von Tierzüchtungen und Tierbehandlungsverfahren 
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Second, the Federal Circuits denial of standing to animal 
rights groups and farmers in Animal Defense may drastically limit 
the possibilities for subjects, other than patentees, to negate the 
scope and contents of an issued patent.176  It appears as if the 
validity of a patent on a transgenic animal can be challenged by 
patentees only, who are not likely to challenge their own patents.177  
While anyone may request re-examination of a patent, he or she 
can do so only on the basis of lack of novelty or 
nonobviousness.178 
Standards of patentability for transgenic animals may not be 
affected directly by third party interests such as farmers and animal 
rights groups.  The present regime provides strong protection for 
societal interest in innovation and the rights of patentees.  
Moreover, opponents appear to have limited opportunities to 
challenge that regime, at least procedurally. 
III. EUROPEAN UNION 
A. Legal Basis 
The European patent system relies on the Convention on the 
Grant of European Patents.179  The EPC aims to harmonise patent 
law among member states of the EU.  Inventors can file patent 
applications in one state cognisable in all member states at the 
European Patent Office (EPO).  The EPO is authorized to examine 
a patent application, reject it, or issue it.  The patentee receives a 
bundle of national rights.  The EPC outlines procedural law while 
 
vom Patentschutz Gerechtfertigt? [Is the Exclusion from Patentability of Animal Products 
and Animal Therapeutic Methods Justified?] 36 GRUR INTL 344 (1987); Straus, supra 
note 169, at 929. 
175  See MERGES, supra note 52, at 189. 
176 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
177 Hecht, supra note 104, at 105960 (including challenges on grounds other than 
inequitable conduct (fraud) or double patenting). See also MERGES, supra note 62, at 
75195. 
178 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).  This does not serve the interests of stakeholders, other than 
patentees, either. 
179 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, October 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 
[hereinafter EPC]. 
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national law determines the substance and scope of patents 
granted.  The EPC also includes important substantive provisions 
that determine the contents and scope of the patents acquired to a 
significant degree.  Post-acquisition procedures are conducted in 
the member states, but enforcement may vary considerably from 
country to country.  Before the conclusion of the EPC, various 
member states had ratified the Treaty of Strasbourg. 
The Treaty of Strasbourg attempted to unify substantial patent 
law.180  This treaty had a profound influence on the formation of 
the EPC,181 but because of the EPC, the Treaty of Strasbourg has 
lost its relevance.182  Furthermore, the Union Patent Treaty has 
been concluded, although it is not yet in force.183  The Dutch 
Patent Act of 1995184 is particularly relevant because the EPC 
provides for a collection of national patents, and national patent 
law is thus important for the content and scope of a particular 
patent.  Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions (hereinafter the Directive) has a profound influence 
on both the EPC and the national patent laws of the member 
states.185  The Directive states that biotechnological inventions 
must be protected by patent law and sets forth the conditions for 
protection.  Member states were supposed to amend their patent 
 
180 Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for 
Inventions, Nov. 27, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 47 [hereinafter Unification Convention]. 
181 It may be considered to be part of its legislative history and, therefore, important for 
its interpretation. 
182 WICHERS HOETH, supra note 53, at 9 (1993). 
183 This treaty will be replaced by the Agreement on Union Patents (1989) as soon as 
such is ratified by twelve member states. Id. at 910; Czmus, supra note 168, at 44344. 
184 Rijksoctrooiwet houdende regels met betrekking tot octrooien [ROW 1995] [Patent 
Act Containing Rules With Respect To Patents 1995], Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 
(amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668) [hereinafter Dutch Patent Act]. 
Because of the scope of this article only a limited review of patent law of member states 
is appropriate. The conflicting views between the Dutch legislature and the European 
Commission on, e.g., the patentability of transgenic animals, is illustrative for the unclear 
situation in which patentees may find themselves when they have obtained a national 
patent under the EPC.  For example, the Netherlands has tried to have European patent 
regulations declared void by the European Court of Justice. See Jan J. Brinkhof, Patent 
Litigation in Europe: Two Sides of the Picture, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 467 (2000) (discussing 
the complexities of patent litigation in the EU).  Another reason for the references to 
particularly Dutch patent law is the Dutch legal education of the author of this article. 
185 Council Directive 98/44/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 1321 [hereinafter Directive 98/44]. 
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laws accordingly by July 30, 2000.186  The Directive has been 
incorporated into the EPC.187 The EPO has been examining patent 
applications for biotechnological inventions in accordance with the 
provisions of the Directive. 
B. Requirements 
EPC article 52(1) states that [E]uropean patents shall be 
granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial 
application, which are new and which involve an inventive 
step.188  Thus, an invention must be novel, industrially applicable 
and comprise an inventive step. 
An invention changes what exists.  An invention that embraces 
a solution must be sufficiently novel and inventive.  An invention 
is novel if it is, in view of the prior art, not known to a person 
skilled in the art.189  The state of the art does not include 
applications that are filed later than the one involved, for the EPC 
applies the first-to-file standard.190  It includes, however, 
everything already public before the day of application.  This 
includes European and foreign patents and pending applications, 
literature, and even oral communications.191  The Technical Board 
 
186 Id. at 2021. The patent acts of most member states are brought into compliance with 
Directive 98/44. In the Netherlands, however, the proposed legislation is still processed 
in the Houses of Parliament.  On April 3, 2002, the Dutch Tweede Kamer der Staten 
General (House of Representatives of the States General) voted against full 
implementation of Directive 98/44. Handelingen Eerste en Tweede Kamer, at 
www.overheid.nl. 
187 See Implementing Regulations to the EPC, June 16, 2000, 1997/7 O.J. 437 
(incorporating Directive 98/44) [hereinafter Implementing Regulations]. This will further 
enhance harmonization of patent law in the EU and will increase the consistency of 
national interpretation of national patents granted pursuant to the EPC with the 
interpretations given thereto by the EPO. This incorporation occurred after the case law 
discussed below was formed and will therefore not be included in the review thereof. In 
view of the timing of the incorporation of Directive 98/44 in the EPC, its provisions will 
be discussed separately. 
188 See EPC, supra note 179, art. 52(1), 1065 U.N.T.S. at 271. 
189 See id. art. 56,. at 273; Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [Dutch Supreme Court] [DSC], 
Jan. 18, 1940, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [NJ] 1940 (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] 
[highest court]). 
190 See id. arts. 54(2)(3), at 272. 
191 See Case T 939/92, Agrevo/Triazole sulphonamides, 1996 E.P.O.R. 171, 17879 
(TBA 1996) (reasoning that state of the art could reside solely in the relevant common 
general knowledge, which again, may or may not be in writing, that is, in textbooks or the 
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of Appeal of the EPO (TBA) applies a problem and solution 
approach for measuring the inventive step and nonobviousness 
requirement. The TBA identifies the closest prior art, assesses the 
technical results of the invention in view of the prior art, defines 
the technical problem that is to be solved by the invention, and 
determines whether a person skilled in the art would have 
suggested the claimed technical features for the solution 
provided.192  Thus, it assumes that the person skilled in the art is 
knowledgeable about publications and other common knowledge 
around the world.193 
The invention must have a technical character.194  The 
technical character of an invention is different from its industrial 
applicability.  Subject matter that may be industrially applicable, 
such as computer software, is excluded.195  The technical 
contribution to the art may derive from the underlying problem and 
the claimed invention as such, or in the means providing for the 
solution of the underlying problem or the effects achieved 
thereby.196  The industrial application of an invention relates to its 
practical applicability.  An invention must offer a concrete solution 
for an existing problem.197 
 
like, or be simply a part of the unwritten mental furniture of the notional person skilled 
in the art); Case T 654/92, Sony/Interessengemeinschaft für Rundfunkschutzrechte 
E.V., 1994 O.J. 1 (TBA 1994); Case T 534/88, BM/Ion etching, 1991 E.P.O.R. 18, 21 
(TBA 1990) (including lecture in state of the art). 
192 See, e.g., Case T 208/84, Computer related invention v. Vicom, 1987 O.J. 14 (TBA 
1986) (requiring technical features to have a practical technical effect). 
193 Case T 020/81, Shell, 1982 O.J. 217 (TBA 1982); see also Hague District Court 
[DC] 41 BUREAU VOOR DE INDUSTRIËLE EIGENDOM [BIE] [NETHERLANDS INDUS. PROP. 
OFF. ] 176 (1991). 
194 Relaxin/Howard Florey institute, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 388  (Opp. Div. 1994); Rule 27 
(1)(a) Implementing Regulations to the EPC. See also supra note 149. 
195 See EPC, supra note 179, arts. 52(2), 53(b). 
196 Case T 833/91, IBM/External interface simulation, 1998 E.P.O.R. 431, 437 (TBA 
1993). 
197 Cf. Case T 939/92, Agrevo/Triazole sulphonamides, 1996 E.P.O.R. 171, 180 (TBA 
1995) (reasoning that the notional person skilled in the art is not assumed to seek to 
perform a particular act without some concrete technical reason: he must, rather, be 
assumed to act not out of idle curiosity but with some specific technical purpose in 
mind).  See also Octrooi Raad [OR] [Dutch Patent Council], 188 BIE 21 (Sept. 30, 
1987). 
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The invention may be a product or a process.198  EPC article 
64(2) states that a patented process encompasses products that 
were directly acquired by application of the process.  EPC article 
83 prescribes enablement requirements.  The invention must be 
described in a manner such that an expert can take all the required 
steps and repeat the invention.  It is insufficient that it is likely that 
the process, described in the specification to the claim, will lead to 
the result described.199  Thus, EU patentability requirements are 
generally similar to those in the U.S.200 
C. Exclusions 
1. Classification 
The EPC contains specific classes of exclusions from 
patentability.  First, article 52(2) says that discoveries, scientific 
and mathematical theories, aesthetic designs, business methods, 
computer programs, and presentations of data are not inventions.  
In view of article 51(1), they are not patentable.201  Second, article 
53 states: 
Patents shall not be granted in respect of: 
(a) inventions whereof the publication or exploitation 
would be contrary to ordre public or morality, provided 
that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary 
merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some 
or all of the Contracting States; 
 
198 See Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14, 
1995, Stb. 1995, 668); Directive 98/44, supra note 185; VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 
60. 
199 See, e.g., Case T 226/85, Stable Bleaches/Unilever, 1988 O.J. E.P.O. 336 (TBA 
1987); VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 325. 
200 See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 42741; Czmus, supra note 168, at 439 
(discussing the novelty requirement); Darrell Dotson, Note, The European Controversy 
Over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 HOUS. J. INTL L. 919, 925 (1997) (noting all 
requirements of patentability). 
201 The technical isolation of a gene, as such, without further modification, could be 
regarded as a discovery.  The EPO considers the isolated gene to be an invention. See 
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 3(1), (2); Case T 292/85, Genentech I, 1989 O.J. 
E.P.O. 275 (TBA 1988). 
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(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals; this 
provision does not apply to microbiological processes or 
the products thereof. 
2. Article 53(a): Ordre Public and Morality 
The EPO strictly excludes patentability of inventions that are 
contrary to ordre public or morality.202  In Plant cells/Plant 
Genetic Systems, the ordre public exclusion was analyzed 
extensively by the TBA.203  In holding that patent offices are at 
the crossroads between science and public policy, the TBA 
rejected the suggestion that patent law is not suited for moral 
considerations.204  It held that morality is concerned with the 
difference between right and wrong.  The totality of acceptable 
norms, deeply rooted in European culture, is the basis for such 
belief.205  Inventions must conform to that belief.206  The concept 
of ordre public focuses on the protection of the physical integrity 
of individuals as part of society, public security, and the 
environment.207 
 
202 Case 320/87, Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. 71 (TBA 1988). See also STEK, supra note 109, at 
47; Straus, supra note 169, at 260. 
203 Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. 545 (TBA 1995) 
(discussing genetically transformed plant cells and plants).  The exclusion of EPC art. 
53(a) has also been discussed in detail with respect to transgenic animals, to be discussed 
below.  Plant Genetic Systems is one of the many cases that may be discussed while 
reviewing EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(a).  For the purpose of this article, such 
discussion is limited. 
204 See STEK, supra note 109, at 46; Schatz, supra note 47, at 2 (suggesting that patent 
law is not aimed at moral considerations). 
205 Various ethical theories determine what is wrong or right. See VAN DE GRAAF, 
supra note 36, at 7072; VERHOOGH, supra note 156 and accompanying text.  Since 
Europe is presently far from being one in a cultural sense, it may be doubted whether one 
set of deeply rooted European norms exists, and if so, how to acknowledge them. 
206 See Plant Genetic Systems, 1995 O.J. at 545 (Plant biotechnology is no more 
wrong than traditional selective breeding.  The inventions at hand were not excluded 
from patentability on this ground.). 
207 See id. (The inventions at hand were not posing a serious threat to the environment. 
Appellants had submitted evidence that genetic engineering of plants as such could 
threaten the environment. It was, however, not extraordinarily likely that the inventions at 
hand would pose such a threat.). 
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The EPO may consider public perception when deciding on 
whether a particular invention violates article 53(a).208  In 
Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems, the EPOs Opposition 
Division stated that public perception is particularly important 
under EPC article 53(a) when determining whether there is a 
general consensus that exploitation of a certain invention is 
immoral.209  The last sentence of article 53(a) states that an 
invention will not be considered contrary to ordre public or 
morality simply because it is prohibited by national laws and 
regulations of the member states.  These laws and regulations 
could, however, impose conditions on biotechnological research 
and development.210  Article 53(a) gives a private right of action to 
the citizens of member states.211 
3. Article 53(b): Plant or Animal Varieties, or Essentially 
Biological Processes, but Not Microbiological 
Processes or the Products Thereof 
a) Plant or Animal Varieties 
The exclusion of plant and animal varieties derives from article 
2 of the Treaty of Strasbourg, 212 which allowed member states to 
ban patents on plant and animal varieties.  With respect to the plant 
varieties, many countries did not want to contravene213 the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
 
208 Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems, 1993 IIC 24 (Opp. Div. 1992). 
209 VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 66.  It may, however, be complicated to determine 
accurately whether such consensus exists. The subject-matter of inventions may be too 
complex for many citizens in EU member states to comprehend.  Also, the consensus 
must not be within one member state, but within the entire EU. Finally, the manner of 
reception of such consensus is unclear, e.g., by referenda, surveys, in the course of the 
opposition procedure of the EPC, supra note 179, article 99, etc. 
210 See, e.g., Gezonheids en Welzijnswet voor Dieren [Health and Welfare Law for 
Animals], incorporated in the Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended 
by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), art. 3b; Besluit Genetisch Gemodificeerde 
Organismen [Decree Genetically Modified Organisms], Stb. 53 (1990). 
211 See Dotson, supra note 200, at 926. 
212 See supra notes 179182 and accompanying text. 
213 See Rudolph Teschemacher, The Practice of the European Patent Office Regarding 
the Grant of Patents for Biotechnological Inventions, 19 IIC 18 (1988). 
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(UPOV),214 which was signed less than two years earlier.  
Originally, UPOV article 2(1) prohibited double protection of plant 
varieties; consequently, many countries devised sui generis 
protection.215  The UPOV ban on double protection was lifted via 
an amendment on March 19, 1991.  In EPC article 53(b), however, 
the exclusion of plant varieties has survived several revisions.216  
The EPO has interpreted the exclusion restrictively in cases 
dealing with plant varieties, excluding plants only in the 
genetically specified form of a particular variety.217 
The reason for excluding animal races from patentability is 
related to the controversy that arose during the preparatory 
discussions for the Treaty of Strasbourg.218  The participating 
countries fiercely debated the ethical implications, resulting in the 
concerned signatories excluding animal races.219  Another reason 
animal races were excluded was the dominating view at the time 
that assumed that patent law was neither suited for, nor 
appropriately directed at, animal races.  The rationale included the 
presupposed difficulties in disclosing the invention, the self-
replicating capabilities of animals that complicate determining the 
content and scope of patents, and the lack of expertise on the part 
of various patent offices and courts.220 
 
214 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
215 In the Netherlands, sui generis protection for plant varieties was arranged in the form 
of the Zaai en Plantgoed Wet [Sowing Seeds and Plants Statute], Stb. 455 (1966). 
216 See also Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 4(1)(a). 
217 See Case T 49/83, Propagating material/Ciba-Geigy, 1984 O.J. E.P.O. 112 A (TBA 
1983); Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71 (TBA 1988); Case T 
1054/96, Transgenic plant/Novartis, 1998 O.J. E.P.O. 511 (TBA 1997) [hereinafter 
Novartis I], referred, Case G 1/98, Transgenic plant/Novartis, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111, para. 
3.10 (Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999) [hereinafter Novartis II].  For the TBAs motivation 
regarding the referral, see 1998 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 193.  As long as plant 
varieties are encompassed by the claim, they are barred. See Case T 356/93, Plant 
cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA 1995).  The TBA affirmed this 
substantive approach in Novartis.  The Enlarged Board of Appeal in Novartis II 
overruled, finally.  The meaning of the exclusion of animal varieties, and its impact on 
the patentability of transgenic animals, is discussed below. 
218 See TESCHEMACHER, supra note 213, at 30304. 
219 See 1998 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 194; Straus, supra note 169, at 913; Von 
Pechmann, supra note 174, at 344; Volker Vossius, Patentschutz für Tiere; 
Krebsmaus/Harvard [Patent Protection for Animals; Onco-mouse/Harvard], 92 GRUR 
INTL 333 (1990). 
220 See Straus, supra note 169. 
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b) Essentially Biological Processes 
Like the exclusion of plant and animal varieties, article 53(b) 
exclusion of essentially biological processes from patentability 
originates from article 2 of the Treaty of Strasbourg.221  At the time 
of the Strasbourg Convention, essentially biological processes 
referred only to the normal, or traditional, breeding activities of 
plants and animals.222  It had been recognized that traditional, 
natural processes are not worthy of patent protection.  Further, they 
could not meet the enablement requirement of EPC article 83 (i.e., 
it was hard to repeat the result and lacked technical character.)223  
Biotechnological advancement has changed this situation.  Now, 
distinguishing an essentially biological process is more difficult 
because of rec-DNA technology.  Humans are able to change the 
genetic material of plants and animals by manipulating the natural, 
or essentially biological, processes.224 
In view of these advances, the EPO has determined what 
processes are essentially biological.  In Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 225 
the TBA held that whether a nonmicrobiological process is to be 
considered essentially biological depends on the extent of human 
intervention, the result achieved thereby, and the essence of the 
invention.226  To render the process not essentially biological, 
human intervention is not enough per se; such intervention has to 
be more than trivial.227 
In Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems,228 the TBA held a process 
for producing plants, combined with a process for genetically 
modifying them, to be essentially biological and, as such, 
 
221 See supra notes 179182, 210 and accompanying text.  The exclusion of essentially 
biological processes is reviewed here because of its indirect impact on the issues that are 
at the heart of this article. 
222 See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 103; Schatz, supra note 47, at 7; Straus, supra 
note 169, at 922. 
223 See WICHERS HOETH, supra note 53, at 30 (1993); Schatz, supra note 47, at 7. 
224 See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 103; Volgens van Nispen, Octrooirecht en 
Biotechnologie [Patent Law and Biotechnology], 1990 AGRARISCH RECHT [AGRARIAN 
LAW] 165, 169. 
225 Case T 320/87, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71 (TBA 1988). 
226 Id. para. V(6). 
227 Id. 
228 Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA 1995). 
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unpatentable pursuant to EPC article 53(b).229  The TBA concluded 
that the transformative step was essentially technical, with a 
decisive impact on the final result.230  The performance of this 
step, and achievement of the result, was not possible without 
human intervention.231  Thus, essentially biological processes are 
those that occur entirely without human intervention.  Also 
considered essentially biological are processes that are influenced 
by human interferences in a trivial manner.232 
c) Microbiological Processes and Products 
The last sentence of article 53(b) indicates that microbiological 
processes and their direct products are distinguishable from 
essentially biological products.233  This exemption derives from 
article 2 of the Treaty of Strasbourg.234  The editing of this 
provision was in line with the distinction that was made at the time 
between macro- and microbiology.  At the time, the 
macrobiological processes and products were not in anyway 
considered to be technological, and thus were not within the 
reaches of patent law.  This was in contrast to microbiological 
processes and their direct products, for which several patents had 
been granted in the nineteenth century.235 
The term microorganism does not have a taxonomic 
meaning, but instead refers to the size of the organisms.  For 
example, pathogens were traditionally considered microorganisms.  
Microbiology deals with the biology of microscopic forms of 
life,236 or microorganisms.  At present, biotechnologies and 
microbiological methods are combined for the genetic engineering 
 
229 Id. para. XI(40.1). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 See Walter Moser, Exceptions to Patentability Under Article 53(b) European Patents 
Convention, 28 IIC 848, 851 (1997). 
233 See EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b). 
234 See supra notes 179182 and accompanying text. 
235 See Schatz, supra note 47, at 5; Joseph Straus, Biotechnologische Erfindungenihr 
Schutz und seine Grenzen [Biotechnological InventionsTheir Protection and Its 
Limitations], GRUR INTL 256 (1992). 
236 MERRIAM WEBSTERS DICTIONARY 326 (Home & Office ed. 1995). 
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of plants and animals.237  This raises the question whether a 
process that is applied on both cellular and genetic levels can still 
be regarded as microbiological, and, moreover, whether the 
direct product thereof can also be considered to be 
microbiological when it is an animal or plant.238 
The TBA has determined that the term microorganism also 
encompasses multicellular material, such as plants, animals, 
plasmids, and viruses.239  Also, the term microbiological process 
only refers to processes that are typically microbiological.  
Products that are created or manipulated with the help of 
microorganisms, by a process that is entirely microbiological, are 
the products that derive directly therefrom.  Hence, they are 
patentable under EPC article 53(b).240 
D. Patents for Transgenic Animals 
1. Historic Development 
Around 1900, German cattle breeders attempted to acquire 
protection for the products they producedthe animals they 
bred.241  Of course, their production methods comprised processes 
of an essentially biological nature.242  In 1969, the first patent for a 
bred animal was granted.243  The Bundesgerichtshof (German 
Court of Appeals) ruled that a pigeon with red feathers could be 
patented under the Patentgesetz (German Patent Act).244  Noting 
that the breeders methodically controlled natural forces to achieve 
a perceivable and causal result, the Bundesgerichtshof determined 
 
237 See TESCHEMACHER, supra note 213, at 307; Moser, supra note 232, at 851. 
238 See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 106. 
239 Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545, para. 29 
(TBA 1995). 
240 See id.; VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 107; Moser, supra note 232, at 849. 
241 See JOSEF KOHLER, HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN PATENTRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF 
GERMAN PATENT LAW] (reprint ed. 1984). 
242 See id.  It is obvious that essentially essentially biological processes created these 
animals; they derived from veterinary selection and breeding as it has been performed for 
thousands of years. 
243 See Rote Taube [Red Pigeon], Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in 
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 52, 74 (75) (F.R.G.). 
244 See id. 
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that their method had a technical character.  The invention, 
however, was not repeatable and, therefore, not patentable.245  
Later, the Treaty of Strasbourg and the EPC explicitly prohibited 
patents on inventions like the red pigeon.  In 1983, however, the 
TBA held that there is no general prohibition on patenting 
modified living subject matter, while explicitly referring to EPC 
articles 52(1) and 53(b).246  This decision was confirmed in Hybrid 
plants/Lubrizol.247 
2. Patents Granted 
In 1990, the EPO granted the first patent on a transgenic animal 
under the EPC, the Onco-mouse.248  The initial application 
contained the following claims: 
1.  A method for producing a transgenic non-human 
mammalian animal having an increased probability of 
developing neo-plasmas, said method comprising 
introducing an activated oncogene sequence into a non-
human mammalian animal at a stage no later than the 8-cell 
stage . . . . 
. . . . 
17.  A transgenic non-human mammalian animal whose 
germ cells and somatic cells contain an activated oncogene 
sequence introduced into said animal, or an ancestor of said 
animal, at a stage no later than the 8-cell stage. 
18.  An animal as claimed in claim 17, which is a rodent.249 
 
245 See id. at 76. 
246 See Case T 49/83, Propagating material/CIBA-GEIGY, 1984 O.J. E.P.O. 112 A, 
para. III (TBA 1983). 
247 Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, para. IV(a) (TBA 
1988). 
248 Case T 19/90, Onco-mouse/Harvard, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (TBA 1990) [hereinafter 
Onco-mouse/Harvard II], (commenting on European patent application 85.304.490.7).  
The TBA considered the impact of this patent within the European Union and took the 
unusual step of publishing the reasons for its decision.  The application and procedure are 
reviewed extensively here.  Onco-mouse/Harvard II is the only fully litigated transgenic 
animal patent under the EPC, and reveals its policy on patentability of transgenic 
animals. 
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a) The Examining Division in the First Instance 
The Examining Division determined whether the applicants 
invention might be considered novel and inventive within the 
meaning of EPC articles 52(1) and 56.250  In light of the exclusion 
of animal varieties of EPC article 53(b), the Examining Division 
had to interpret the meaning of the term animal variety.251  It 
rejected252 the TBAs narrow interpretation of the term plant 
variety.253  Animals can never be technical.254  The Examining 
Division suggested that this determination is supported by the 
different terms that are used in the applicable texts of the EPC.255  
According to the Examining Division, the meaning of the terms 
Tierarten, animal varieties, and races animales partially overlap, 
and this justifies a broad interpretation.256  This broad definition 
leads to the exclusion of all animals, since all animals belong to a 
race and all races to a species.257  Furthermore, the Examining 
Division stressed that animals could never be direct products of 
microbiological processesthis would enable evasion of the 
exclusion of animal varieties and is unacceptable.258  Thus, claims 
17 and 18 were denied (with respect to non-human mammalian 
animals and rodents) completely.  The Examining Division also 
denied the claim with respect to the ancestors noting that they 
 
249 European Patent Application No. 85.304.490.7, reprinted in Onco-Mouse/Harvard 
II,1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 para. I. 
250 See Case V 4/89, Onco-mouse/Harvard, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div. 
1989) [hereinafter Onco-mouse/Harvard I], revd, Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. 
E.P.O. at 476.  This discussion follows the exact order of the various procedural stages 
and the EPO groups analysis and contents. 
251 Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para. 7.1. 
252 Id. para. 7.1.4.  The restrictive interpretation was adopted in view of the existing sui 
generis protection for plant varieties, and the UPOV prohibition of double protection. See 
supra Part III.C.3(a). 
253 Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, para. IV(e) (TBA 
1988). 
254 See Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para. 7.1.4. 
255 See id.  Pursuant to EPC article 177, the convention is published in three equally 
valid and applicable languages: German, French, and English (the official languages of 
the EU). 
256  Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para.7.1.4. 
257 Id. para. 7.1.6. 
258 Id. 
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would result from natural reproduction, which is an essentially 
biological process.259 
The Examining Division did not consider the process to be 
microbiological.260  It also did not deem it to be essentially 
biological, for it involved micro-injection of genetic material into 
the nucleus of the embryos.261  The process was, however, 
considered unpatentable because of the enablement requirement of 
EPC article 83.262  The Examining Division thought that the 
genetic differences among all sorts of mammalians are too large to 
have a reasonable expectation that the process can be repeated on 
all of these.263  Thus, the process claims were also denied264the 
application was denied entirely. 
Furthermore, the Examining Division determined that, in itself, 
the claimed invention was not violating ordre public or 
morality.265  It conducted a marginal review: inventions were to 
be excluded from patentability only if they would lead to uproar, 
disturbance of the public order, or criminal behavior.266  It simply 
concluded that such is not the case with the invention at hand.267  
The invention was considered to be beneficial to mankind.268  The 
Examining Division justified its restrictive test of EPC article 53(a) 
for precluding patentability on the ground that it did not consider 
patent law the appropriate instrument for solving the problems that 
may derive from genetic engineering.269 
 
259 The Examining Division ignored the fact that the claims did not refer to reproductive 
means. Thus, the descendants could also result from technological processes, such as 
cloning.. 
260 The Examining Divisions reasons for this conclusion do not appear in the decision. 
261 Onco-mouse/Harvard I, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. para. 7.2.1. 
262 Id. para. 11. 
263 Id. para. 11.2. 
264 Id. para. 7.2.4. 
265 Id. para. 10.1. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. para. 10.2 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
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b) The TBA in the Second Instance 
On appeal, the TBA first considered the repeatability270 of the 
invention.271  It determined that a specification to a claim does not 
have to set forth the application of the process entirely if it 
concentrates on a new field of technology.272  Only if the 
repeatability is seriously doubted does EPC article 83 bar 
patentability.273  It concluded that the specification enables a 
person skilled in the art to repeat the processes involved in micro-
injection of genetic material and expression thereof.274  Harvard, 
the patent applicant, asserted that the invention could be applied to 
other mammals than mice, by the inclusion of the term non-
human mammalians in the specification.275  The TBA did not 
have any opposing evidence.276 
The TBA considered the article 53(b) preclusion of animal 
variety patents an exception to the general requirements criteria in 
article 52(1).277  Therefore, it had to be interpreted restrictively.278  
The legislative history of the Treaty of Strasbourg and the EPC 
does not support the broad interpretation of the Examining 
Division.  According to the TBA, the inclusion of the terms 
Tierarten, animal varieties, and races animales in the text of the 
EPC supported a restrictive interpretation.279  The second 
exclusion contained in EPC article 53(b) embraces animals as 
such.280  The respective terms used in the different translations, 
i.e., Tiere, animals, and animaux, have the same meaning.  If 
they did not have a different rationale and meaning, the drafters 
would not have used different terminology for the exclusions. 
 
270 See EPC, supra note 179, art. 83. 
271 Onco-Mouse Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 3 (TBA 1990). 
272 Id. para. 3.3. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. para. 4. 
278 Id. para. 4.5.  This is in compliance with Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 
1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, para. V(5)(6) (TBA 1988). 
279 Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4.6. 
280 Id. para. 4.1 (excluding essentially biological processes for the production of . . . 
animals). 
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The TBA held that the EPO has to find a compromise between 
an inventors need to receive appropriate protection for his 
invention and the publics interest that certain categories of 
animals be excluded from patentability.281  Before such a 
compromise can be found, one first needed to ascertain the exact 
meanings of the terms Tierarten, animals, and animaux.282  If the 
mice did not fall within the scope of these terms, their patentability 
was not barred by article 53(b).283  If the mice did fall within the 
scope of one of these terms, the correctness of such term was to be 
reviewed through comparison with the other two terms.284 
The TBA agreed with the Examining Division with respect to 
the non-essentially biological nature of the process of micro-
injection,285 but it did not agree that the ancestors produced 
through natural reproduction were excluded from patentability.286  
It concluded that this exclusion for processes had been applied 
incorrectly to the Onco-mouse.287  Claim 17 applied to products-
by-process, the ancestors, that remain products for the purpose of 
patentability.288  Also, it found that if the parents were not 
excluded from patentabilityto be determined under article 
53(b)then the ancestors were also not to be excluded, for they 
were genetically identical.289 
The final sentence of EPC article 53(b) contains an exception 
to the exclusion from patentability of that provision.290  The 
general requirements for patentability are fully applicable to 
microbiological processes and their direct products, contrary to the 
decision of the Examining Division in this regard.291  The direct 
products of microbiological processes were held to be patentable, 
even if they were animals.292  Thus, it was necessary to determine 
 
281 Id. para. 4.5. 
282 Id. para. 4.6. 
283 Id. para. 4.8. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. para. 4.9.1. 
286 Id. para. 4.9.2. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. para. 5. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
3-KOOPMAN FORMAT 12/12/02 3:19 PM 
160 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:103 
whether the process at hand was a microbiological one, and if so, 
whether the animals derived directly from it. 
The TBA held that a full test to the article 53(a) exclusion of 
patentability was necessary, especially for applications that 
embrace genetic engineering inventions.293  Genetically modifying 
animals by inserting oncogenes may be problematic in view of the 
ordre public.294  First, it may cause animal suffering.295  Second, 
eventual release of the animals would have unlimited and 
irreparable consequences.296  In determining a patent application, 
the EPO needed to balance the interests in preventing animal 
suffering, environmental protection, and humankinds need for 
curing genetic diseases.297  Consequently, the TBA remanded the 
case to the Examining Division.298 
c) The Examining Division in the Third Instance 
On remand, the Examining Division concluded that the 
meaning of EPC article 53(b) is unclear in light of the different 
terms its translations contain (Tierarten, animal varieties, and 
races animaux).299  Claims 17 and 18 of the application focused on 
non-human mammals, such as rodents, and particularly mice.  The 
Examining Division subsequently defined animal variety as: 
[R]odents or even mammals constitute a taxonomic unit 
much higher than species.  An animal variety or race 
animale is a sub-unit of species and therefore of even 
lower ranking than a species.  Accordingly, the subject 
 
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 Id.  These considerations relate to oppositions that were conducted pursuant to EPC, 
supra note 179, article 99.  Some of the filed oppositions are discussed in Morin, supra 
note 69, at 15960. 
297 Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 5. 
298 Id.  Pursuant to EPC, supra note 179, article 111(1), the TBA could have decided the 
case itself or, as it did, remand to the Examining Division.  It remanded because the 
review in this case was important, deserving two instances. 
299 Case V 6/92, Onco-mouse/Harvard, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 2 (Examining Div. 
1992) [hereinafter Onco-mouse/Harvard III]. 
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matter of the claims to animals per se is considered not to 
be covered by the . . . terms of article 53(b) EPC.300 
Hence, with respect to the animals, the application was not rejected 
under EPC article 53(b).301 
Furthermore, the Examining Division held that genetic 
engineering inventions as such do not violate ordre public or 
morality, and, therefore, do not need to be excluded from 
patentability per se pursuant to EPC article 53(a).302  It determined 
that: 
(i) A patent does not give the patentee a right to 
exploitation, but the right to exclude others from exploiting 
the invention for a certain period of time;303 
(ii) [t]he principle is patentability; exclusions therefrom 
need to be interpreted restrictively;304 
(iii) [n]ew technologies always bring new risks; the risks 
need to be reviewed in view of the benefits those 
technologies; after such review the determination about 
patentability can be made;305 
(iv) [i]f inventions concern higher forms of life, the 
possible sufferance of these forms because of the invention 
needs to be considered in aforementioned review;306 [and] 
(v) [t]his review needs to be made with respect to every 
invention, on a case-by-case basis.307 
Subsequently, the Examining Division balanced the interests 
mentioned by the TBA.308  It concluded that the invention at hand 
 
300 Id.  Thus, the claims do not focus on Tierarten, animal varieties, and races 
animaux.  In fact, the Examining Division conducted a zoological classification.  To be 
able to do so, however, it must have had defined them. 
301 Id. para. 4(v). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. para. 3. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. para. 4. 
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did not violate the ordre public or morality309 for the following 
reasons: 
(i) The invention is beneficial to human beings; cancer is a 
disease that has numerous victims, and every new means in 
the battle against this disease should be welcomed;310 
(ii) [a]nimal suffering will decrease because of this 
invention; a smaller number of animal models will be 
needed than in conventional research;311 
(iii) [t]here are no alternatives to animal models for cancer 
research;312 
(iv) [i]n view of the need for environmental protection, the 
purpose and use of the invention needs to be considered; 
the animal models that are produced by the invention are to 
be used in laboratories by skilled personnel; the chance that 
the animals may end up in free nature is small, and would 
only increase by a mistakeand the risk of a mistake 
cannot in itself support denial of the application at hand;313 
[and] 
(v) [t]he fact that a certain technology may create risks does 
not render it a violation of ordre public or morality; the 
exploitation of such technologies must be regulated by 
governmental bodies other than the EPO.314 
As a result, it granted the patent.315 
3. The European Case Law Reviewed 
Clearly, transgenic animals can fulfill the requirements of EPC 
articles 52(1) and 56.  They can be novel, inventive, and have 
industrial application.316  Genetically modified animals can have a 
 
309 Id. 
310 Id. para. 4(i). 
311 Id. para. 4(ii). 
312 Id. para. 4(iii). 
313 Id. para. 4(iv). 
314 Id. para. 4(v). 
315 Id. 
316 See generally id. 
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technical character, so long as they do not derive from essentially 
biological processes.317  Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems shows 
that as long as the same result could not have been achieved 
without human intervention, and the difference from the result 
without such intervention is not trivial, they are not so produced.318  
In case the applied method of genetic modification can be 
considered to be microbiological, the animals that directly derive 
therefrom are patentable.319  This is so, regardless of whether the 
animal would be a Tierart, animal variety or race animaux.320 
In view of Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, it may be 
doubted whether the process of genetically modifying an animal 
(such as micro-injection in the case of the Onco-mouse) can be 
regarded as microbiological.  In Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, 
the TBA held that only processes that are typically microbiological 
would be included.321  It may be argued that the biotechnological 
process is of decisive importance to the final resultthe transgenic 
animal with the particular feature.  Furthermore, and contrary to 
the determination of the TBA in Onco-mouse/Harvard, it has been 
held that entire multicellular organisms cannot derive from 
microbiological processes.322 
The zoological classification that the Examination Division 
made in Onco-mouse/Harvard III is not entirely correct.  The 
 
317 See Case T 320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71, paras. 46 (TBA 
1988); Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA 
1995). 
318 Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para. 18.7. 
319 Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.9.2 (TBA 
1990). 
320 The EPO uses both the terms races animaux and races animals.  Its terminology is 
followed where the applicable holdings are relevant.  The correct term is races animales. 
321 Plant genetc systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para. 17.113. 
322 See id.  The TBA held that the modified cells could directly derive from the 
microbiological process, not the entire plant. But see Novartis, Case T 1054/96, 1998 O.J. 
E.P.O. 511, paras. 4850 (TBA 1997) (requiring a conceptual approachthe question is 
whether the modified organism is still related to the microbiological process, or comes 
closer to a variety).  Arguably, this approach cannot stand.  Article 53(b) is clear on the 
inclusion of products that derive directly from microbiological processes: they are 
patentable.  A conceptual approach does not seem reconcilable with this provision 
whereas a technical approach, see, e.g., Plant Genetic Systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para. 
17.113, seems to be. Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4, seems to confirm this with 
respect to EPC articles 53(b) and 64(2). 
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Examination Division considers Tierarten (species) to be of a 
higher taxonomical unit than the animal varieties and races 
animaux, whereas the latter are considered as of the same 
taxonomical unit.323 
Varieties and races, however, do not have to be of the 
same taxonomical unit.324  Depending upon the particular 
circumstances, the term variety may relate to a higher or lower 
taxonomical unit than races.325  The term variety means 
deviation from type or species.326  Thus, varieties could be 
deviations from a species, from a race, or from a specific variety 
within the same species or race.327  In line with the holding of the 
TBA, it should be determined whether an invention falls within the 
scope of any of the terms used in the respective texts of EPC 
article 53(b).  Thus, the invention may resemble a race, a 
variety of a race, an Arte, a variety of an Arte and, 
obviously, a variety of a variety of a race or Arte.  If any of 
the terms apply, it should be determined whether they have the 
correct meaning.328  In the case of transgenic animals, the 
invention will mostly be a variety of a particular raceit 
concerns minor genetic changes that will not easily result in a new 
race.329  Within the near future, however, biotechnologists may 
create new races.  Certain chimaeras may be genetically 
distinguishable from the races that have provided their genetic 
partsthey may not be classifiable in one or the other racial 
category.330 
Onco-mouse/Harvard permits the issuance of broad patents.  
The application must focus on taxonomical units higher than 
Tierarten, whereas the specification only has to instruct the 
successive steps to be performed in modifying one type of animal 
 
323 Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 2 (Examining 
Div. 1992). 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 HENDERSONS DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGICAL TERMS, supra note 1, at 578. 
327 On the zoological classification of animals (including human beings), see MARGULIS 
& SCHWARTZ, supra note 119. 
328 Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.8 (TBA 1990). 
329 See Schatz, supra note 47, at 10. 
330 See Vossius, supra note 219, at 334. 
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of one race.331  To protect the patentability of his other invention 
from being barred by article 53(b) exclusion, the inventor just has 
to avoid addressing his or her claim to a particular animal (of a 
particular race).  The EPO will only reject if there is  serious doubt 
about the applicants assertions in the specification.  The TBA 
seems to assume that all processes of genetic modification will, in 
principle, be performable with all animals, and that such 
performance will be successful as well.332  The enablement 
requirement of EPC article 83 is hereby weakened.  Thus, in view 
of Onco-mouse/Harvard, inventors can quite easily obtain broad 
patents for minimal description (and perhaps minimal invention) 
with respect to transgenic animals under the EPC.333 
In view of EPC article 53(a), it is clear that the EPO applies 
ethical principles to the patentability of transgenic animals 
according to the deontological and consequentialist theories.334  
The TBA has provided for a balancing test between the purposes 
and consequences of the invention.335  The EPO needs to review 
the purposes of the invention in light of their benefits and their 
consequences, such as animal suffering and the effects on the 
environment.336  Applicants may, however, have to pass difficult 
hurdles before their claims are awarded, in view of the opposition 
procedure that is provided in EPC article 99.  The TBA has taken 
opposition seriously and considers it in its deliberations.337 
4. Directive 98/44338 
Directive 98/44 article 1 requires that member states of the EU 
protect biotechnological inventions through their patent laws.  This 
 
331 Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 2 (Examining 
Div. 1992); Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 para. III (Enlarged Bd. of 
App. 1999). 
332 Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 3.3, .8. 
333 See Dotson, supra note 200, at 933; Funder, supra note 131, at 557. 
334 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
335 Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 5 (applied by the Examining 
Division in Onco-mouse/Harvard III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. at 589). 
336 Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 5; VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 
7072. 
337 See Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4.9.2; Dotson, supra note 200, at 
926. 
338 See supra note 185. 
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follows the case law of the EPO.339  Directive 98/44 article 2 
defines the terms biological material and microbiological 
process.  Article 2(1)(a) states that biological material means 
any material containing genetic information and capable of 
reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological system.  This 
definition clearly encompasses animals.  Article (2)(1)(b) states 
that a microbiological process is any process involving, or 
performed upon, or resulting in microbiological material.  Article 
2(2) states that a process for the production of plants and animals is 
essentially biological if it consists entirely of natural phenomena, 
such as crossing and selection.  Article 2(3) states that an effective 
EC Regulation defines the term plant variety.340  Animal 
variety is not defined.  Article 3(1) determines that inventions that 
fulfill the general requirements of patent law are patentable, even if 
they concern biological material.  Article 3(2) states that biological 
material which is isolated from its natural environment or 
produced through a technical process can be the subject of an 
invention, even if it occurred previously in nature.  This provision 
permits the patenting of not only genes that are isolated from the 
genome, but also of plasmids, viruses, and entire animalsif they 
can be produced through a technical process.341 
Article 4 provides that: 
1.  The following shall not be patentable: 
(a) plant and animal varieties; 
(b) essentially biological processes for the production 
of plants or animals. 
 
339 See, e.g., Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 paras. 4850 (Enlarged Bd. 
of App. 1999); Case T 356/93, Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 
(TBA 1995); Onco-Mouse Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 4.9.2 (TBA 1990); Case T 
320/87, Hybrid plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 71 (TBA 1988). 
340 Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 2(3). 
341 In Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. at 545, the TBA doubted whether this 
could be achieved though a biotechnological process as such.  Regarding the first part of 
the provision, an animal that has been isolated from its natural surrounding (caught by a 
technical catching technique containing an added biotechnological element) can be 
patented, arguably, as a product-by-process. 
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2.  Inventions, which concern plants or animals, shall be 
patentable if the technical feasibility of invention is not 
confined to a particular plant or animal variety 
3.  Paragraph 1(b) shall be without prejudice to the 
patentability of inventions which concern a microbiological 
process or other technical process or product obtained by 
means of such process.342 
Article 4(1)(a) and (b) follow EPC article 53(b) and the pre-
existing case law.343  It should be noted, however, that the term 
essential biological processes has a more restrictive meaning 
under Directive 98/44 than it had under the pre-existing case law.  
Directive 98/44 article 2(2) provides that they are processes that 
are comprised entirely of natural phenomena, such as crossing and 
selection.  The case law shows that essentially biological processes 
are those that occur without a decisive human intervention.344  
Directive 98/44 deviates therefrom in the sense that all processes 
that are not entirely biological are not essentially biological.  The 
EPO may consider animals produced by sexual reproduction, but 
with slight human interference, to be derived from other 
processesand as such patentable. 
Article 4(2) also follows the case law of the EPO, and makes 
clear that varieties as such are excluded from patentability.345  The 
terms in the effective text of Directive 98/44 are Tierrassen, races 
animals, and animal varieties.346  Applications for inventions 
 
342 Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 3(2). 
343 See Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. paras. 4850; Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. 
E.P.O. at 545; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476. 
344 Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. para. 17.1. 
345 See Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. paras. 4850; Plant genetic systems, 1995 O.J. 
E.P.O. at 545; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476. 
346 See Von Pechmann, supra note 174, at 347 (arguing that most applications will focus 
on a lower taxonomical level than species, and, therefore, the exclusion would function 
only if it was directed at those lower levels and that this would serve consistency). 
Vossius, supra note 219, at 337, argued, conversely, that the terms animal varieties and 
races animaux should be replaced by the terms animal species and espèces animales 
(arguing that since inventions are not likely to encompass species, the exclusion should 
be directed to it).  The English equivalent of the terms races animales and Tierrassen 
would have been animal races.  Because of inclusion of the term animal variety, 
varieties as such cannot be patented, and also confusion may remain on the particular 
meaning of the exclusion in a particular case. 
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that are directed at taxonomical units higher than those of races 
and (racial) varieties will not be barred by the exclusion that is 
provided for by article 4(1)(a), its implementation in national 
patent law, or EPC article 53(b).  Since Directive 98/44 does not 
refer to enablement requirements, such as are included in EPC 
article 83, it is likely that the light standard of the TBA will be 
applied by the EPO, and that inventors can acquire broad animal 
patents with less description.347 
Article 4(3) follows the case law with respect to the products-
by-process patents for animals, akin to the ones that are provided 
for in the last sentence of EPC articles 53(b) and in EPC article 
64(2).348  It seems to broaden, however, the scope of the products 
that are derived by the processes.  The term direct, as it appears 
in EPC articles 53(b) and 64(2), is omitted; the products may be 
produced by means of a microbiological or other technical 
process.  Furthermore, and in view of the definition of 
microbiological processes in article 2(1)(b), it is likely that the 
EPO considers methods of genetic modification to be 
microbiological.349  The reasoning of the Examining Division in 
Onco-mouse/Harvard shows that these products can be produced 
by means of such processes.350 
 
347 See Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476.  Note that national courts are 
competent under national law with respect to the enforcement of the patent, including 
validity procedures, etc.  Absent any reference to the enablement requirement in 
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, the national courts will set their own standards, not 
necessarily the same as that of the TBA.  For example, in the Netherlands, the 
enablement requirement of the Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended 
by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), article 25 is applied rather strictly. See 
WICHERS HOETH, supra note 53, at 28. 
348 See Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. at 111; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 
at 476.  As described, it may not be difficult to directly produce an animal through a 
process that is not an essentially biological one. See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 
2(2). 
349 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 2(1)(b).  The clause states that 
microbiological processes are processes that involve, or are performed upon, or result in 
microbiological material.  Pursuant to this definition, methods of genetic modification, 
such as were used in Onco-mouse/Harvard, will be considered microbiological. 
350 Consequently, the decision in Plant cells/Plant genetic systems, Case T 356/93, 1995 
O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA 1995), that entire animals can never derive directly from a 
microbiological process: only the genetically modified cells, looses its importance.  The 
animals do not need to derive directly from the process, but must be produced by means 
thereof. 
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Directive 98/44 article 5(1) dictates that the human body, at the 
various stages of its development, and the discovery of one of its 
elements, including the sequence of a gene, are not patentable.  An 
element isolated from a human body or otherwise produced by 
technical means may constitute a patentable invention pursuant to 
clause 2 of this provision.  Further, article 6 states that: 
1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their 
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public 
or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed so 
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or 
regulation. 
2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, 
shall be considered unpatentable:  
(a) processes for cloning human beings;  
(b) processes for modifying the germ line identity of 
human beings;  
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes;  
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of 
animals that are likely to cause them suffering without 
any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and 
also animals resulting from such processes.351 
Article 6(1) deviates from EPC article 53(a); it is narrower.  Only 
commercial exploitation can be contrary to ordre public or 
morality.  EPC article 53(a) provides for inventions of which the 
publication or exploitation is contrary to ordre public or morality.  
The patentability of human beings, their parts, and material is 
excluded in a broad manner.  The exclusion of processes for 
genetic modification of animals, and the animals resulting 
therefrom, by article 6(2)(d) is in line with the balancing test as 
outlined in Onco-mouse/Harvard.352 
 
351 Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 6. 
352 Directive 98/44, supra note 185, article 6(2)(d) provides for a combination of the 
deontological and consequentialist theories.  However, in view of considerations 4043 
and article 6(2)(a)(c), it is noted that Directive 98/44 makes a hard distinction between 
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Article 7 provides that the European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies (Group) evaluates all aspects of 
biotechnology.  This provision reveals the European inclination to 
actively focus on ethical considerations with respect to the 
patentability of transgenic animals.  Since the Group will function 
outside of the patenting process, its reports are likely to have 
interpretative value for national courts and the EPO.  It is likely, 
therefore, that the Group will play a role in future proceedings 
under EPC article 99 (the opposition procedure).353 
Directive 98/44 articles 8 to 11 state the content and scope of 
patents granted for biotechnological inventions.  Article 8(1) sets 
forth that the protection conferred by a patent on biological 
material possessing certain characteristics as a result of the 
invention shall extend to any biological material derived from that 
biological material through propagation or multiplication in an 
identical or divergent form and possessing those same 
characteristics.  Clause 2 of this provision states that patents 
granted for processes of genetic modification extend to the 
products directly obtained thereby, and to material obtained 
through propagation or multiplication derived from these products.  
These provisions confirm the determination of the TBA toward 
patentability of the descendants of the genetically modified 
mice.354  They also confirm the case law with respect to the scope 
of patents for microbiological and other processes, as defined by 
EPC articles 53(b) and 64(2).355  They also significantly broaden 
the scope of patents for transgenic animals by stating that the 
patents scope extends to all material that derives from the patented 
product, whether in the same or divergent form, if it possesses the 
 
animals and human beings.  Human beings can never be patented, whereas animals can 
be patented.  An absolute principle is thus applied: human beings are not animals.  The 
legal reflection of this principle shows that the framers of Directive 98/44, unlike the 
EPO, applied the virtue theory as well. 
353 See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 69; Drahos, supra note 161, at 448. 
354 Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.9.2 (TBA 
1990). 
355 Id., para. 4.8; see also Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 para. 4 
(Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999). 
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same characteristics.  This will allow for a chain patent, whose 
scope will expand continuously.356 
Directive 98/44 article 9 provides that the protection conferred 
by a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic 
information shall extend to all material in which the product is 
incorporated and in which the genetic information is held and 
performs its functionexcept where it involves human beings.  As 
a result of this provision, the questions about patentability of 
transgenic animals and animal varieties under the EPC become, to 
a large extent, irrelevant.  A patent granted on a gene, or gene 
construction, extends to the animals in which such a gene is 
inserted and expressed.  Acquisition of a patent on a gene will 
suffice to obtain a de facto patent on all animals that possess and 
express that gene.357  The exclusion of patentability of animal 
varieties by EPC article 53(b) and by article 4(1)(a), will therefore 
only be effective with respect to inventions that result in new 
animal varieties (races). 
Directive 98/44 articles 10 and 11 provide exceptions to the 
scope provided for by articles 8 and 9.  Article 10 contains a 
restrictive first-sale-rule (exhaustion of patent) within the EU if the 
biological material was obtained with the consent of the patentee 
and is used for the purpose for which it was acquired.  Subsequent 
propagation or multiplication will, however, lead to patent 
infringement.  Pursuant to article 10, a breeder can mate the 
acquired transgenic animals, as well as use acquired semen for 
reproduction, if he or she has acquired these products with the 
consent of the patentee within the EU and the reproduction serves 
the purpose for which the products were acquired.  Subsequent 
animals may, however, not be used for reproduction.  Article 10 
thus provides for a breeders exemption. 
 
356 This may lead to conflicting patents if, for example, two patented animals are crossed 
to produce a third animal.  Neither Directive 98/44, supra note 185, nor the EPC, supra 
note 179, provides for a resolution to eventual conflicts.  Most national patent laws of the 
member states of the EU do not have conflict provisions, either. See, e.g., Dutch Patent 
Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668). 
357 See Robin Nott, You Did It!: The European Biotechnology Directive at Last, 20 
EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 347, 348 (1998).  This may lead to unsolvable conflicts 
between patents.  The patents on the gene, the process, and the animal may be in different 
hands. 
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Article 11(2) provides for a farmers exemption.  The sale or 
any other form of commercialization of breeding stock or other 
animal reproductive material to a farmer by the holder of a patent 
or with his consent implies authorization for the farmer to use the 
protected life stock for an agricultural purpose.  This includes 
making the animal or the reproductive material available for the 
purpose of pursuing his or her agricultural activity but not for sale 
within the framework or purpose of a commercial reproduction 
activity.  Article 11(2) gives a farmer who, for example, produces 
milk or cheese, the right to use the acquired transgenic animals or 
semen for reproduction if this serves his agricultural goals.  These 
goals cannot include commercial breeding.  It is likely that the 
initial prices of transgenic animals and their materials will rise 
because of the exemptions in articles 10 and 11.  Thus, it may be 
doubted whether these exemptions will serve the economic needs 
of breeders and farmers. 
Directive 98/44 article 12 provides for a compulsory license for 
users of plant varieties and associated materials that fall within the 
scope of a patent.  Such licenses are not provided for users of 
animal varieties and associated materials.  Directive 98/44 article 
13 allows for description of the invention for the purpose of 
enablement as required by EPC article 83 and Dutch Patent Act 
article 25 by deposit.  It may be doubted, however, whether deposit 
of transgenic animals can serve as description for enablement.358 
5. Issues Reviewed 
a) Novelty and Inventive Step 
Patentability of transgenic animals, as provided for by the 
reviewed case law and Directive 98/44, may not correspond with 
the general requirements for patentability as defined by EPC article 
52(a) and the patent laws of member states.359  As the Canadian 
 
358 See supra note 168; infra text accompanying note 366. 
359 See, e.g., Dutch Patent Act, art. 2; Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 1, 2(1)(a), 
4(2) (allowing animals to be patented as products; id. art. 9 (allowing animals to be 
patented as material in which a patented product is inserted and expressed); id. arts. 
2(1)(b), 4(3) (allowing animals to be patented as products by microbiological process); 
id. arts. 4(1)(b), 2(2), 4(3), 8(2) (allowing animals to be patented as products by other 
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Federal Court has noted with respect to the Harvard mouse: the 
presence of the myc gene is new, but the mouse is not new.360  
Thus, the patentability of entire animals may, strictly considered, 
violate clear case law of the EPO and the EPC.361  Particularly, the 
patentability of entire transgenic animals that have undergone only 
minor genetic modifications may be problematic in view of the 
usual assessment of the inventive stepthe technical result of the 
invention in view of the matter that was pre-existing.362 
b) Enablement 
The TBA has loosely applied the enablement requirement as 
incorporated in EPC article 83.363  This may lead to patents that do 
not cover their contents, because inventors need to describe their 
invention as not comprising an animal of a particular race, 
otherwise, it would be excluded from patentability.364  Because of 
TBAs loose application of EPC article 83, however, the inventors 
can describe their invention in broad terms, i.e., comprising 
various species, whereas the invention is only applied (and thus 
 
processes); Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476.  The absence of any 
technical addition may be shown most clearly in the case of a gene, which is isolated 
from its environment and inserted and expressed in an animal without further 
modification.  The processes of isolation and insertion may be technical according to the 
traditional view.  However, under Directive 98/44, supra note 185, articles 3(2) and 8(1)
(2), patents will be granted not only to the processes, but also the gene, and all the 
animals that carry such gene (whether produced via technical insertion of the gene or by 
propagation). 
360 Harvard College v. Canada, [1998] 3 F.C. 510, revd, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.). 
361 See EPC, supra note 179, arts. 27(1)(a), 52(a), 54; Case V 8/94, Relaxin/Howard 
Florey institute, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 388 para. 6 (Opposition Div. 1994). 
362 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
363 Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. para. 19(a). See also Spindler, Current 
Patent Protection Granted For Genetically Modified Organisms Under The EPC and the 
Scandal of EP 0695351, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 95, 11215 
(2001).  After opposition procedures on July 2224, 2002, the Edinburgh Patent, EP 
0695351, was limited, so as to not include human or animal embryonic stem cells, but 
still covers non-embryonic stem cells that are modified.  See Press Release, EPO, 
"Edinburgh" Patent Limited After European Patent Office Opposition Hearing (July 24, 
2002), at http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2002_07_24_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2002).  This meets Spindlers criticism. 
364 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 4(1)(a), (2); Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 
O.J. E.P.O. 111 (Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999); Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 
para. 19(a). 
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enabled and disclosed) on one variety or race of one species.365  In 
the long run, these patents do not serve the underlying goals of 
patent lawstimulation of technological innovation.366  Patent 
applicants may disclose the invention by deposit of the material 
concerned: the animals.367  Deposit, however, may not lead to full 
disclosure because the presence and expression of a gene in a 
modified animal is not always externally perceivable. 
Practical problems may arise by the deposit of entire animals at 
the EPO.368  Furthermore, problems may arise because EPC article 
54(3) provides that patent applications are part of the prior art, 
and EPC article 92 provides for publication of the application.  
One may doubt whether a third party can accurately acquire the 
prior art from the publication of the application.  Pursuant to EPC 
article 13(2), third parties can acquire a sample of the deposited 
material.  One also may be skeptical about the enforcement of this 
provision, in case a transgenic animal is deposited; or, to put it 
differently, how many animals must be deposited to serve the goal 
of this provision? 
c) Exclusion of Animal Varieties 
In view of the required broad description of the invention in the 
patent application,369 the low standard applied to enablement and 
repetition,370 the animals that are considered to be produced by 
microbiological processes,371 the animals that are produced by 
 
365 See Sven Bostyn, DNAOctrooien, mag het een beetje meer zijn? [DNAPatents, 
Could It Be A Little More?], 2002 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 258, 25859 (particular to 
EU situation); Rochelle K Seide, Janet M. MacLeod & Carmella L. Stephens, Drafting 
Claims for Biotechnology Inventions in 11TH ANNUAL PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP: 
ADVANCED CLAIM DRAFTING & AMENDMENT WRITING at 294 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-00PK, 2001) (discussing 
enablement difficulties in general). 
366 See supra Part I.C; Funder, supra note 131, at 552. 
367 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 13. 
368 See infra text accompanying notes 41516. 
369 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 4(1)(a), (2); Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. at 
111; Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476, para. 4.9.2 (TBA 
1990). 
370 See Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476. 
371 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 2(1)(b), 4(3); Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 
at 111; Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476. 
3-KOOPMAN FORMAT  12/12/02 3:19 PM 
2002] PATENTABILITY OF TRANSGENIC ANIMALS 175 
processes of sexual reproduction not being essentially 
biological,372 the animals falling within the scope of the patents 
granted on the gene they carry and express,373 and the animals 
propagated from animals patented in one of these manners,374 one 
can conclude that the exclusion of animal varieties does not have 
much meaning left in the European Union at this time. 
d) Ordre Public and Morality 
The EPO will surely apply the exclusion from patentability of 
inventions that are considered to be contrary to ordre public or 
morality, particularly when an application embraces transgenic 
animals.375  Onco-mouse/Harvard illustrates the manner in which 
this exclusion will be applied by the EPOvia of balancing the 
interests involved.  As a result of Directive 98/44 article 6(1), 
which provides that only inventions whose commercial application 
violates ordre public or morality are unpatentable, it seems that all 
inventions with other purposes may be patented.  Note, however, 
that one of the main goals of patent law is to allow the patentee to 
exploit his/her invention commercially while excluding others 
from doing the same.  It is unlikely that inventors will apply for 
patents without wanting to use them for such exploitation.376  
 
372 Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 2(2), 4(1)(b). 
373 Id. art. 9. 
374 Directive 98 /44, supra note 185, art. 8(1), (2). See Spindler, supra note 363 
(discussing EP 0 695 351). 
375 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. (2)(d), 6(1); EPC, supra note 179, art. 
53(a); Onco-Mouse/Harvard II, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. at 476; EPO President Ingo Kober, 
Address at the EPO Annual Press Conference (June 27, 2000) (excerpt available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2000_06_27_e.htm). 
[O]ur patent examiners are keenly aware of the ethical problems attending such 
applications . . . . There is . . . a staff notice . . . calling attention to the specific 
items in the list of ethical prohibitions in the Directive.  There is an early 
warning system for ethically sensitive applications, and there are arrangements 
of quality monitoring . . . . 
Id. 
376 See, e.g., the exclusive rights of a patentee under Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, 
Stb. 1995, 51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), art. 53(1)(a), (b) 
(granting the patentee the exclusive right to sell the patented product professionally and 
to apply the patented process professionally).  Dutch Patent Act article 53(3) excludes 
research and preparation of medicine in a pharmacy for an inventors private purposes 
from the scope of the patent.  Hence, at least in the Netherlands, the commercial 
restriction of Directive 98/44, supra note 185, article 6(1) does not seem to make sense. 
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Furthermore, Directive 98/44 does not provide a definition of the 
term commercially.  This creates uncertainty.  In view of the 
balancing test that is provided for in Directive 98/44 article 
6(2)(d), definitions need to be formed.  It is unclear what standards 
should be applied, while balancing the suffering of animals with 
the substantial benefit to humankind.  The meaning of these 
terms is unclear. 
e) Definitions of Species 
Directive 98/44 articles 5 and 6(1), (2)(a)(c) provide that 
human bodies, certain human materials, certain processes for 
genetic modification of human beings, and human cloning are 
unpatentable.  Neither the EPC nor Directive 98/44 defines terms 
such as human body, human identity, human origin, human 
being, or what constitutes an animal, however.377  This seems 
odd, especially because plant variety is given a particular 
definition.378  The lack of a well set out and clear definitions may 
cause problems when biotechnology advances and new inventions 
are made which demand determination of their zoological 
nature.379 
f) Third Party Interests 
In view of the approach of the EPO to EPC article 53(a), and 
its detailed consideration of oppositions filed pursuant to EPC 
article 99 in Onco-mouse/Harvard, it is likely that third parties, 
such as animal rights groups, will increasingly be in a position to 
express their opinions on the patenting of particular transgenic 
animals (and other biotechnological inventions).  Since under the 
EPC opponents can file an opposition to a patent application, or to 
an EPO patent until nine months after the issuance,380 the legal 
certainty of patentees and their licensees may be diminished.  In 
view of Directive 98/44 article 7 and the advisory and evaluative 
role of the European Group on Science and New Technologies (the 
 
377 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, arts. 5, 6, and considerations 9, 1617, 2021, 
2627, 29, 38, 4042, 4445 (noting the terms applied). 
378 Directive 98/44, supra note 185, considerations 3032. 
379 See supra Part II.D.3(d) for suggestions on definitions. 
380 See EPC, supra note 179, art. 99(1). 
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New Technologies Group), the non-technological aspects of 
patenting transgenic animals (and other biotechnological 
inventions) will be considered on a permanent basis.  The New 
Technologies Group will most likely attend to the interests of third 
parties, such as animal rights groups and farmers, and will 
influence further developments in European patent law. 
Directive 98/44 articles 10 and 11 provide for exemptions to 
the scope of patents for breeders and farmers.  Article 12 does not 
include a compulsory licensing scheme for these groups.  Unless 
the national legislatures regulate the patentees and licensees 
rights,381 it is likely that the exemptions of referenced articles will 
not suit the economic needs of breeders and farmers.  Patentees 
will most likely raise prices of their products at initial acquisition 
to include royalties that would, without the exemptions, be 
collected afterwards. 
IV. THE PATENTABILITY OF ANIMALS: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
A. Transgenic Animals as Subject Matter 
Both in the U.S. and the EU, transgenic animals as such 
(products) can fulfill the requirements for patentability.382  In the 
U.S., the decisions in Chakrabarty383 and Ex parte Allen384 and the 
Harvard mouse patent385 show that animals that do not occur in 
nature could be patented.386  In the EU, Onco-mouse/Harvard and 
Directive 98/44 articles 1, 2(1)(a), and 4(2) show that animals can 
fulfill the requirements for patentability.387  Both in the U.S. and 
the EU, the patent offices grant patents for the entire animals 
 
381 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, consideration 51. 
382 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Onco-mouse/Harvard 
III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 4.8, .10 (Examining Div. 1992). 
383 447 U.S. at 304. See also Quigg v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 900 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 
1990); Quigg, supra note 157. 
384 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 142627 (S.D. Tex. 1987). 
385 See Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106. 
386 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
387 See Onco-mouse/Harvard I, Case V 4/89, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div. 
1989), revd, Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (TBA 1990). 
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concerned, but the actual invention may be the insertion of one 
gene and expression thereof, to alter directly only a minor portion 
of the genome of the animals.388  Clearly, both in the U.S. and the 
EU, the patent offices uphold a low standard for novelty and 
nonobviousness (in the EU, inventive step).389 
Both in the U.S. and the EU, transgenic animals can be 
patented as products-by-process.  In the U.S., section 103(b) of the 
Act provides that the products of biotechnological processes fall 
within the scope of the patent on the process.  In the EU, EPC 
articles 53(b) (last sentence) and 64(2), Directive 98/44 article 
2(1)(b), in conjunction with article 4(3) and articles 4(1)(b), 2(2), 
4(3), and 8(2), and the decisions in Onco-mouse/Harvard and 
Novartis II make it clear that animals fall within the scope of the 
patents on the processes from which they derive.390 
In the EU, animals are also protected by the patents on the 
genes that are inserted into and expressed in them.391  This patent 
protection is not available in the U.S.  In this regard, the EU offers 
more possibilities for animal patents.  Both in the U.S. and in the 
EU, genes as such are patentable.392  In the U.S., however, the 
patent on the gene will not, by operation of law, extend to the 
animals in which it is inserted and expressed.  The animal 
concerned has to be patented as a manufacture or composition of 
matter or the process whereby it was modified.393  Only then will 
the animal be within the scope of the patent.  In the EU, the 
inventor and patentee of a gene has the certainty that all animals in 
which it is incorporated will be within the scope of his/her 
 
388 See Onco-mouse/Harvard III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589; Harvard mouse patent, supra 
note 106.  For other U.S. patents, see supra notes 111116. 
389 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101103 (2000); EPC, supra note 178, art. 52(1), 56; Directive 
98/44, supra note 185, arts. 1, 2(1)(a), 3(1).  For a different approach, see Harvard 
College v. Canada, [1998] 3 F.C. 510, revd, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.); In re Deuel, 51 
F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
390 Together with a loose application of the enablement requirement and crafty drafting 
of (broad) claims, this latitude leads to the controversial scope of patent EP 0 695 351. 
See Spindler supra note 361. 
391 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 9. 
392 Compare In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558, with Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 
3(2). 
393 See Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (BPAI 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 77 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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patent.394  Conversely, in the U.S., inventors can apply openly for 
patents on transgenic animals as such.395  Thus, they can attempt to 
acquire a patent on one modified animal, a group of animals, a 
variety, andin case such will prove to be possible in the future
a race that has been created through biotechnology.  In the EU, an 
application cannot directly focus on one animal or animals 
belonging to one race.396 
B. Restrictions on Patentability 
In the U.S., laws and products of nature are not patentable.397  
In principle, animals produced by propagation are produced 
through a process that is subjected entirely to the laws of nature, 
and are themselves products of nature.398  However, the PTO and 
courts apply the doctrines of laws of nature and products of nature 
restrictively.399  This is also revealed by some of the patents that 
the PTO has granted for transgenic animals produced by sexual 
reproduction; some claims explicitly include such animals within 
their scope.400  Other patents implicitly include such sexually 
produced offspring.401 
In the EU, essentially biological processes and their products 
are not patentable,402  but an essentially biological process has to 
consist entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or 
selection.403  Thus, processes of sexual reproduction that are 
carried out with a slight human intervention may be subject to 
 
394 See supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
395 See supra notes 75, 100, 106, 383, 384. 
396 See EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b). 
397 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
398 See id. at 310. 
399 See id. at 309; Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
400 See U.S. Patent No. 5,221,779 (issued 1993, withdrawn) (The claim includes  . . . 
transgenic mouse offspring produced by the mating . . . .). 
401 See Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, (claiming a transgenic non-human 
mammal . . . or an ancestor); U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (issued July 15, 1997), 
(claiming a transgenic mouse or the progeny thereof ). 
402 EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b); see also Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 
4(1)(b). 
403 Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 2(2). 
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patent law, as may the products (animals) thereof.404  Therefore, 
the patent offices and courts of the U.S. and EU restrictively apply 
the doctrines that deal with products that occur naturally. 
In the U.S., an invention must be useful pursuant to article 101 
of the Act.405  Utility is, in principle, also related to the benefits 
that derive from an invention to society.406  The PTO and county 
apply this doctrine very restrictively with respect to inventions 
consisting of transgenic animals.407  The PTOs only moral 
restriction on patentability of living subject matter deals with 
human/animal chimeras,408 but the distinction between what is 
human and what is animal is unclear.409  The various patents 
granted for animals containing human genes seem to suggest that 
the PTO will not consider an invention a human/animal chimera as 
long as its genome consists mostly of naturally occurring, non-
human genes.  Although at least one federal court decision seems 
to suggest that the doctrine of beneficial utility may be invoked 
more often with respect to biotechnological inventionssuch as 
transgenic animalsthis is not very likely.410  In the EU, EPC 
article 53(a) and Directive 98/44 article 6 provide for exclusions 
from patentability of inventions that are contrary to ordre public 
and morality.  These grounds for exclusion are similar to the 
grounds that would govern if the PTO applied a broad doctrine of 
beneficial utility.411  Onco-mouse/Harvard shows that these 
exclusions are fully effective under the EPC and that inventions are 
 
404 See the patent granted in Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 
589 (Examining Div. 1992) (Claim 17 encompasses a transgenic non-human 
mammalian . . . or an ancestor of said animal . . . .). 
405 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
406 See Magnani, supra note 100, at 452. 
407 See supra notes 160161. 
408 See Quigg, supra note 157. 
409 See supra note 161. Because of the lack of an unequivocal distinction between what 
is human and what is not, it will not be easy to apply moral restrictions.  Practical 
application will certainly be controversial.  For a socio-political, philosophical, and, here 
and there, legal perspective on the matter, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN 
FUTURE, CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION, part 3 (2002). 
410 See Tol-o-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991); supra note 155. 
411 Compare EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(a), and Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 
6(1), with Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1553, In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 17881 (C.C.P.A. 
1960), and Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568). 
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indeed reviewed with regard to their purposes and consequences.  
Onco-mouse/Harvard and article 6(2)(d) provide for a balancing 
test between, on one hand, the benefits to humanity deriving from 
the invention and, on the other hand, the animal suffering caused. 
The President of the EPO recently confirmed this approach in a 
public statement.412  The constitution of the European Group on 
Science and New Technologies, as stated in Directive 98/44 article 
7, also states that these exclusions will remain active in European 
patent lawperhaps more active then ever before.  Thus, when 
patent applications are received in the EU, the EPO and national 
patent offices will consider non-technological concerns, such as 
those related to the well-being of animals, the overall ethical 
consequences of a certain invention, and environmental protection.  
These considerations are not included in the review of a patent 
application by the PTO and U.S. courts. 
Both in the U.S. and the EU, human-related inventions are 
more or less excluded from patentability.413  In the U.S., 
human/animal chimeras are not statutorily excluded from 
patentability, but the PTO has announced that it will not issue 
patents for human/animal chimaeras.414  The basis for this 
exclusion is unclear.415  Also, neither the PTO nor courts have 
determined what constitutes a human and what constitutes an 
animal.416  In the EU, the exclusion of human-related materials 
from patentability has a statutory basisin the EPC pursuant to the 
incorporation of Directive 98/44 in its Implementing Rules, and 
 
412 See Kober, supra note 375. 
413 See Directive 98/44, supra note 185; Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1553; Nelson, 280 
F.2d at 17881; Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019. 
414 Compare EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(a), and Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 
6(1), with Tol-o-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1553, Nelson, 280 F.2d at 17881, and Lowell, 15 F. 
Cas. at 1019. 
415 It has been suggested that this exclusion derives from the U.S. Constitutions 
prohibition on slavery, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See Fishman, supra note 159, at 472
80; Walter, supra note 46, at 1047.  Both authors reject this ground for the exclusion, as 
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits human servitude, not a temporary right to combine 
human and animal genes. 
416 See supra note 111. 
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within the near future in the member states after full 
implementation in their patent acts.417 
Directive 98/44 article 5(1) determines that the human body, in 
its various stages of development, cannot be patentable.  Clauses 2 
and 3 of this provision state conditions under which human genes 
may be patented.  Directive 98/44 article 6(2) (a)(c) states that 
processes for human cloning, processes for modifying the germ 
line identity of human beings, and uses of embryos for industrial or 
commercial application are unpatentable.  Arguably, the products 
deriving from these processes may be patentable.  Although the 
unpatentable inventions that relate to human beings have been 
specified more in European patent law than in the U.S., the 
definitions of these materials also remain unclear in the EU.  
Neither the EPC nor Directive 98/44 gives a definition for what 
constitutes a human being and what constitutes an animal.  
Thus, both the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU contain a 
critical uncertainty in their terminology.  In view of the rapidly 
advancing biotechnology, there is a pressing need for formation 
and inclusion of clear definitions.418 
C. Enablement 
Both U.S. and European patent law provide for the deposit of 
biological material in order to fulfill the enablement requirements 
under the respective regimes.419  Under both regimes, however, 
deposit as such will most likely not lead to de facto full disclosure.  
 
417 See, e.g., Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2001 O.J. (C 331) 231, 23145 (2002) (rejecting the Netherlands 
requests for invalidation of Directive 98/44).  The Netherlands is obliged to implement 
Directive 98/44 immediately in the Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 51 
(amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668).  Resistance in the Netherlands 
continues, however, and therefore the controversy is likely to be prolonged. See Sven 
Bostyn, Het Sprookje is uit.  De beslissing van het Europese Hof inzake de Nederlandse 
vodering tegen richtlijn 94/44/EG [The Fairy Tale is Over.  The European Courts 
Decision in Regard to the Dutch Claim Against Directive 94/44/EC], 11 BIE 392 (2001); 
Andrew Scott, The Dutch Challenge to the Bio-Patenting Directive, 1999 EUROPEAN 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 212. 
418 See Ducor, supra note 158, at 259; Fishman, supra note 159, at 47880; Jagels, 
supra note 77, at 146. 
419 Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2000), with EPC, supra note 179, art. 83, and 
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 13. 
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This is because the expression of genes within animals may not be 
observable externally.  Also, practical problems may arise, such as 
the storage and maintenance of the animals.  In Europe, patent 
applications become part of the prior art.420  In view hereof, EPC 
article 92 provides for immediate publication when applications 
are filed.  This is because under European patent law the EPO 
issues patents to the first one to file the application (first-to-file 
system).  Directive 98/44 article 13(2) provides, therefore, for the 
issuance of samples of the material immediately after its deposit to 
interested parties.  In the case of the deposit of transgenic animals, 
one may doubt how this would be arrangedwithout demanding 
that the applicant deposit numerous animals.  In the U.S., pursuant 
to section 122(a) of the Act, patent applications at the PTO were 
confidential until the law was changed in November 1999 to 
require publication 18 months after the earliest filing date.421  This 
is because under U.S. patent law the PTO issues patents to the first 
one to invent (first-to-invent system).  After a patent has been 
granted by the PTO, samples may be obtained by interested parties 
as well; the same questions about how this should be done with 
entire animals arise as in the EU.  Thus, both under the patent 
regimes of the U.S. and the EU, there are problems with respect to 
disclosure and enablement of inventions consisting of transgenic 
animals.  These problems lead to a lack of internal (towards the 
patent offices) and external (towards third parties) disclosure.422 
In view of the substantial review of the repeatability of the 
invention, pursuant to the enablement requirement, it is likely that 
the PTO will have a more traditional and strict test than the EPC.  
Under U.S. patent law, single transgenic animals and groups of 
animals belonging to or forming the same race can be patented.  
This will allow inventors to construct their claims, and to provide 
descriptions, in an accurate mannerand the PTO will review 
 
420 EPC, supra note 179, art. 54(3). 
421 See Pub. L. No. 106-13, 113 Stat. 1501a-563 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122). 
422 See Czmus, supra note 168, at 44041.  Czmus also mentions problems that relate to 
the discrepancies that exist between the U.S. and the EU on the release criteria for 
samples and the existing disparity between the deposit deadlines. 
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these accordingly.423  Under EU law, applicants are forced to 
construct their claims and provide descriptions in a broad manner, 
comprising not only one animal or a group of animals belonging to 
the same race, but also other animal races (or even higher 
taxonomical units).  It is clear that the EPO will not review 
repeatability too strictly, for if it were to do so it is likely that many 
patents could not be granted.424  This may lead to patents that are 
too broad and are not justified by the underlying inventions.425  A 
careful balance has to be struck between not granting an inventor 
patents that are too limited and not granting him/her patents that 
are too broad in order to serve the purpose of patent law 
(technological innovation).426  In view of the foregoing, it may be 
concluded that the PTO strikes this balance better than the EPO, 
the approach of which may be considered to be out of balance.427 
D. Scope of Patents 
Both under the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU, the 
patent offices grant patents for genetically modified animals, as 
well as their offspring.428  The terms applied in Directive 98/44 
article 8 (propagation and multiplication) are, however, broader 
 
423 In fact, this has happened since the broad Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, was 
granted.  Most, but not all, patents granted after 1988 have a more limited scope. See, 
e.g., supra notes 111116. 
424 See Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (TBA 1990).  Also 
see the final patent granted in Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 
589 (Examining Div. 1992). 
425 See supra notes 111116. 
426 See supra Part I.D. 
427 Compare the Act, 35 §§ U.S.C. 100122 (2000); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 309 (1980), Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427 (BPAI 1987), affd, 
846 F. 2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, and the patents 
mentioned in notes 11116, with EPC, supra note 179, art. 53(b), Directive 98/44, supra 
note 185, art. 4 (1)(a),(2); Case G 1/98, Novartis II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 (Enlarged Bd. 
of App. 1999), and Onco-mouse/Harvard III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. at 589. 
428 Compare the Harvard mouse patent, supra note 106, (claiming a transgenic non-
human mammal . . . or an ancestor), with the patent granted in the Onco-mouse/Harvard 
III, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. at 589 (claiming a transgenic non-human mammalian . . . or an 
ancestor of said animal). See also Directive 98/44, supra note 185, art. 8 (extending 
patent protection to material obtained through propagation or multiplication of patented 
products); e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,648,597 (1997) (claiming  a transgenic mouse or 
progeny thereof); U.S. Patent No. 5,221,779 (1993) (claiming  transgenic mouse 
offspring produced by the mating). 
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than the terms found in patents granted so far for transgenic 
animals under U.S. patent law (offspring, progeny, and similar 
terms).  The latter do not include clones of the animals concerned, 
whereas the term multiplication in Directive 98/44 article 8 
especially addresses these reproductions of the patented animals. 
E. Third Party Interests 
Under U.S. patent law, no exception to the scope of patents 
granted on transgenic animals exists,429 in contrast to European 
patent law that provides for detailed and specific exceptions for 
both breeders and farmers (Directive 98/44 article 10 and 11).430  
Note that the exhaustion rule of Directive 98/44 article 10 is 
triggered only if the material is acquired in the EU; thus, U.S. 
farmers will have to go to Europe to acquire the preferred 
materials.  It may be doubted whether U.S. breeders and farmers 
economic interests will be seriously affected by the absence of 
such an exemption.431  If, however, their interests suffer, it may be 
doubted whether an exemption, as articles 10 and 11 of Directive 
98/44 provide, will be sufficient to protect these interests.  
Patentees could prevent any loss of income by demanding higher 
prices at the initial acquisition of the animals or animal material
and the European exemptions would then be useless.432 
Pursuant to the decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund, it 
seems that third parties, such as animal rights groups and farmers, 
cannot bring direct actions to challenge the validity of a patent 
issued under U.S. law, e.g., with respect to its subject matter, 
 
429 See supra Part II.D.3(f). 
430 See supra Part III.D.5(f). 
431 See Hecht, supra note 104, at 1073 (suggesting that patentees will not find it 
economically necessary to enforce their rights to the full extent and collect royalties); 
Walter, supra note 46, at 104142 (suggesting that the benefits of the transgenic animals 
will lower costs for farmers drastically, even if the higher acquisition prices and royalties 
are included and that inventors would without patent protection license out their animals 
more selectively).  The latter suggestion is based on the assumption that alternative legal 
instruments, like the general law of contracts, will not provide enough protection to the 
inventor.  This assumption is reviewed and confirmed. See ENZING, supra note 174, at 21; 
Straus, supra note 219, at 929; Von Pechmann, supra note 174. 
432 See Walter, supra note 46, at 1042. 
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contents or scope.433  This may seriously hamper the influence 
outsiders can exercise on the development of the patent law with 
respect to biotechnological inventions.434  Under European patent 
law, third partieslike referenced oneshave opportunities to 
express their opinions with respect to the patenting of a certain 
invention.  EPC article 99 provides for an opposition procedure 
that can be initiated by anyone until nine months after the patent 
is granted (clause 1).  The TBA of the EPO has taken oppositions 
filed under EPC article 99 very seriously and has included them in 
its reviewfor example, regarding to the exclusions of EPC article 
53(a).435  This approach was recently confirmed by the President of 
the EPO.436  Also, Directive 98/44 article 6 provides for a broad 
test of ordre public and morality.  In view of the foregoing, it can 
be concluded that the concerns of third parties are likely to be 
heard during, or shortly after, the review of a patent application 
filed under the EPC.  These concerns, however, cannot be 
expressed in a like manner at a similar time in the U.S.  Obviously, 
other means, such as negotiating with interest groups, lobbying at a 
 
433 See Quigg v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 900 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1990); MERGES, supra 
note 62, at 75195; Hecht, supra note 104, at 105960 (referring to challenges on other 
grounds than inequitable conduct (fraud) or double patenting).  The animal rights 
groups and farmers (plaintiffs) in Quigg objected to the patenting of transgenic animals 
on moral and economic grounds, respectively.  The doctrines of inequitable conduct 
and double patenting are not suitable for addressing these objections. 
434 But see Drahos, supra note 161, at 447.  Drahos strongly opposes this lax situation.  
He argues that civilians should have a voice in the developments, because of the 
profound influence patent law has on their life.  Arguably, Drahos position does not 
seem more justifiable with respect to biotechnological inventions than with other types
mechanical and chemical inventions could have strong influences on the civilian life, as 
history has shown.  The complexity of the invention at issue presents a problem to direct 
civilian participation.  The influence might be useful only when the inventions are truly 
understood. See VAN DE GRAAF, supra note 36, at 66 (stating that external societal 
influences influences on patent litigation may, however, increase the legitimacy and, 
therefore, the certainty of the patent). 
435 For the TBAs final considerations and interests-balancing illustrated through 
opposition procedures, see Onco-mouse/Harvard II, Case T 19/90, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 
(TBA 1990). See also Onco-mouse/Harvard III, Case V 6/92, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 589 para. 
2 (Examining Div. 1992). 
436 See Kober, supra note 375. 
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political level, and raising broad public attention to the issues 
concerned may very well be available in the U.S.437 
European patent law generally provides for compulsory 
licensing in cases of public interest.438  These licenses are rarely 
granted by the national authorities, e.g., the minister of economic 
affairs,439 a court,440 or a patent office.441  Nonetheless, the system 
of compulsory licensing may provide a basis for protection of the 
 
437 These means are shown by the various bills that have been initiated in Congress, 
which served the interests of animal rights groups and/or farmers. See Hecht, supra note 
104, at 105758. 
438 See, e.g., EPC, supra note 179, art. 73; Dutch Patent Act, Dec. 15, 1994, Stb. 1995, 
51 (amended by statute on Dec. 14, 1995, Stb. 1995, 668), arts. 5758; WICHERS HOETH, 
supra note 53, at 59, 69. 
439 Dutch Patent Act art. 57 
440 Id. art. 58 
441 For example, in the Netherlands, compulsory licenses for algemeen belang [public 
interest] have been granted just twice, both by the Dutch Patent Office, shortly after the 
Second World War. See Dutch Patent Office, 1946 BIE, Nov. 25, 1946, at 9.  The 
minister of economic affairs had considered a compulsory license just once, and rejected 
it.  The minister determined that the public interest must eclipse the general 
governmental policy goals, which the case did not do. See Decree of the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, BIE 1981, Jan. 9, 1980, at 185.  Public interest is not the individual 
corporations interest in competitive advantage, unless the product concerned could be 
marketed by another party for a lower price, and other circumstances necessitate such. 
See Chamber of Appeal, Patent Office, BIE, Feb. 17, 1932, at 136; Chamber of Appeal, 
Patent Office, BIE, July 19, 1972, at 236.  Furthermore, the Dutch Supreme Court has 
approached the issue of compulsory licenses and authorization of patent infringement 
carefully and restrictively. See Dutch Supreme Court, BIE, Apr. 21, 1995, at 409 (holding 
that, in principle, the interests of third parties should not be protected by allowing patent 
infringement). 
 Six years before, the President of the District Court of The Hague had allowed 
infringement (a de facto compulsory license).  It held that patients interest in having 
access to certain medicines outweighed the patentees stated financial interest, which 
could be safeguarded by damages or other compensation. President of the District Court 
of The Hague, Nov. 21, 1989, No. 89/2069 (unpublished).  Both cases addressed section 
168 of book of 6 of the Dutch Civil Code, which could serve as a defence to a patentees 
claim for prohibition of infringement, and hence could lead to a de facto compulsory 
license. 
 In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court] has determined that öffentliche 
Interesse [public interest] is to be defined and applied according to the circumstances of 
the case, and a balancing between the patentees interests and the societal interests.  In 
case other, similar but not identical and infringing products are available, the balance 
favours the patentee: a public interest for a compulsory license is not present. See 1996 
GRUR INTL 948; de Ranitz, Dwanglicenties: Heden Verleden en Toekomst [Compulsory 
Licenses: Past, Present and Future] 2 IER 4247 (1992). 
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interests of third parties that have a pressing need to make use of 
the invention.  U.S. patent law does not provide for compulsory 
licensing.442  Recently, an international discussion has arisen 
among governments, patentees, and other interested parties about 
the need for compulsory licenses for patented inventions, such as 
medicines, which are of profound importance to humanity.  This 
discussion derives from the exclusionary power of the patentee, 
which may directly harm those in need of the patented 
invention.443 
V. HARMONIZATION 
A. General Remarks 
The foregoing shows that the extent to and the manner in 
which transgenic animals can be patented under U.S. and European 
patent law differs significantly.  This is analogous to the content 
and scope of patents that are granted by the respective patent 
offices.  The discrepancies concerned may damage the continuous 
and successful technological innovation that is pursued by patent 
law.444  Lack of clarity, uncertainty, and differing requirements for, 
and standards of, protection would not contribute to the incentive 
of the mostly globally active inventors in the field of 
biotechnology.  On the contrary, it would increase the 
 
442 See MERGES, supra note 62, at 189. 
443 See F.M. Scherer, Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property 
Rights: The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2249 (2000); Rosemary Sweeney, The U.S. Push for Worldwide 
Patent Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision, 
9 PAC. RIM. L. & POLY J. 445, 46367 (2000); Melody Peterson, Suits Accuse Drug 
Makers of Keeping Generics Off the Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at C1; Sheryl G. 
Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Keeping Down the Competition: How Companies Stall Generics 
and Keep Themselves Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at A1; Karl Vick, African 
AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War; US Policy Keeps Prices Prohibitive, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 4, 1999, at A1.  Given the scope of this article, the details of this debate are not 
discussed further. 
444 See SHERWOOD, supra note 53, at 67, 191 (comparing European and U.S. patent 
law); Josh Lerner, Patent Policy Innovations: A Clinical Examination, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1841, 184245 (2000); North, supra note 53, at 13132; (discussing the interaction 
between patent law policy and economy); supra Part I.D (providing an extensive 
economic analysis). 
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appropriability problem.445  Harmonization is needed!446  
Although the international intellectual property framework was not 
reviewed above, since the end of the nineteenth century, 
governments and international organizations have attempted to 
harmonize national patent law.447  The Convention of Paris for the 
Protection of Industrial Property provides to its members, 
including EU member states and the U.S., international patent 
protection.448  It provides, inter alia, a priority right for inventors, 
who also have the opportunity to file multiple applications 
simultaneously with the offices of the members.449  In 1967, 
numerous countries formed the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) with the purpose of harmonizing patent 
law.450  Although some achievements have hereinafter been made, 
the most important initiative of WIPO, creating a universal 
application procedure, has failed.451  The Geneva Patent 
Harmonization Treaty (GPHT)452 derives from WIPO.  It provides 
 
445 See K.W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings Of Patent Law, 1994 J. LEGAL STUD. 
246, 24647 (providing extensive analysis of the stimulating function of patent law, the 
influences on the incentive of inventors, and the problem of appropriability). 
446 See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in 
International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 GEO. 
WASH. INTL L. REV. 277, 28081 (2001); Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent 
Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INTL L. 591, 59192 (1994); North, supra note 53, at 13132; Carrie 
P. Smith, Patenting Life: The Potential and the Pitfalls of Using the WTO to Globalize 
Intellectual Property Rights, 26 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 143, 18081 (2000). 
447 See generally Gerald J. Mossinghot & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent Systems Circa 
20XX, A.D., 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 523, 52540 (1998) (describing patent 
treaties and regional patent systems). 
448 Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (as 
revised July 14, 1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583; 24 U.S.T. 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
449 See id. art. 4. 
450 Convention Establishing WIPO, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. 
451 See Dotson, supra note 200, at 923 (noting that WIPO has never recognized patent 
protection for transgenic animals, and concludes, therefore, that it may not be the 
appropriate organization to address the discrepancies in transgenic patent law); North, 
supra note 53, at 13738 (describing similar attempts by others).  One of the reasons for 
the failure in creating a universal application procedure is related to the essential 
differences between the first-to-file systems effective in the EU, Japan and most of the 
world, and the first-to-invent system that is effective in the U.S. See generally, Kevin 
Cuenot, Note, Perilous Potholes in the Path Toward Patent Law Harmonization, 11 J. L. 
& PUB. POLY 101 (1999) (providing a historic and legal overview of the failure to 
harmonize patent laws).  First steps towards harmonization are being made, however. See 
supra note 316. 
452 See Czmus, supra note 168, at 45960. 
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for some initial steps towards harmonization of the first-to-file 
systems of the EU and Japan, and the first-to-invent system of the 
U.S.453  Furthermore, it determines that the patent duration is 
twenty years, and provides for a single format of the patent 
application.454  In the course of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), the countries concerned formulated the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).455  TRIPS 
confirms the duration of patents, as provided for under the GPHT.  
In the course of TRIPS, parties attempt to bring the first-to-file 
system (EU) and the first-to-invent system (U.S.) closer towards 
one another and to take away the discrepancies that derive from the 
application of these different systems.456 
TRIPS also contains provisions that influence the substantive 
patent law of its members.  For example, article 27(1) sets forth a 
minimum standard for patentable subject matter.  It determines that 
patents must be available for inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.457  Also, article 27(2) provides that members may 
exclude inventions from patentability, if the commercial 
exploitation of these inventions must be prevented in view of the 
public order or good morals, including the protection of human, 
animal and plant life and the protection of the environment.  
Article 27(3) provides for an exclusion from patentability of 
animals and plants, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals, which are not microbiological or 
biological processes.458  These and other provisions of TRIPS only 
provide for minimum standards and exceptions thereto, however, 
which are not defined in detail.  Members of TRIPS can decide to 
 
453 See id. 
454 See id. 
455 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement], ANNEX 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTSRESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm. 
456 See Czmus, supra note 168, at 462. 
457 TRIPS, supra note 454, art. 27(1). 
458 The EU has made use of this provision; the U.S. has not. See Cheek, supra note 446, 
at 29296. 
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make use of the exceptions or not (the EU has made use of this 
exception; the U.S. has not).  They also can go beyond TRIPS and 
provide more extensive protection under their patent regimes.  
Thus, the few substantive provisions of TRIPS do not form a solid 
basis for harmonization of the regimes discussed.459  Another 
treaty, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), provides for the filing 
of one application that serves as an application in all forty-four 
members.460  The U.S. and the EPCand its membersare also 
PCT members but the PCT only addresses the application and not 
the substantive examination of its compliance with the 
requirements for patentability and, therefore, does not serve 
harmonization in this respect too well either. 
In view of the foregoing, harmonization should be pursued by 
the respective patent offices and/or by the national and regional 
(EU) legislatorsthe latter being in a position to substantially 
change the regimes under which the patent offices grant or deny 
patents.  The failed attempts to achieve this on a broad 
international level may justify bi- or trilateral legislative actions.461  
Such action should be concentrated on the substantive 
requirements for, and exclusions from patentability.462  Hence, this 
article now turns to a proposal concerning the manner in which 
those individual requirements and exclusions in the patent laws of 
the U.S. and the EU could best be harmonized with regard to 
transgenic animals. 
B. Patent Requirements Revisited 
1. Novelty and Nonobviousness 
The different novelty standards applied under U.S. and EU 
patent law (respectively the first-to-invent and first-to-file 
 
459 See Cheek, supra note 446, at 29296; Carlos M. Correa, The GATT Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: New Standards for Patent 
Protection, 16 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 327 (1994). 
460 The Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645; 1160 U.N. T. S. 231. 
461 See Cheek, supra note 446, at 28992, 30009, 31521; Cuenot, supra note 450, at 
10208; Czmus, supra note 168, at 459, 462. 
462 See Michael Meller, Principles of Patentability and Some Other Basics for a Global 
Patent System, 83 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 359, 35960 (2001). 
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standards) need harmonization.  Their specific workings, including 
the definitions of what constitutes prior art, the grace periods 
granted, and prior use exceptions, as well as the procedural 
complexities that derive from them are disregarded here.463  
Although the different standards applied profoundly influence the 
manner in which inventions are patentable, and therefore need 
harmonization, the patenting of transgenic animals are not 
influenced any more greatly than that of other inventions.464  
Furthermore, although both standards lead to a different conclusion 
as to what constitutes prior art, the examination of that art does not 
seem to be different in the U.S. and the EU.  In principle, the 
substantive application of the nonobviousness adhered to under 
U.S. and EU patent law does not differ significantly.465  Under 
both regimes, the biotechnological steps taken are acknowledged 
and inventors can obtain patents with broad claims for their 
transgenic animals. 
Generally, however, the claims of U.S. patents for transgenic 
animal patents seem to be narrower than the claims of EU patents.  
 
463 See Cuenot, supra note 450, at 113; Meller, supra note 462, at 362 (discussing 
novelty); Toshiko Takenaka, Impact of 1999 Patent Reforms: A Comparative Law 
Perspective, 7 CASRIP NEWSL. 2 (2000). 
464 A general note: only the patent laws of the U.S. and the Philippines still apply the 
first-to-invent standard.  In the U.S., patents can be granted to the first one to conceive 
or to reduce the invention to practice.  Novelty is tested against worldwide publications 
existing prior to the application filing, and against all uses within the U.S. 35 U.S.C. § 
102(a)(b) (2000).  Conversely, pursuant to the patent law in the EU, patents are granted 
to the first one to file a patent application, and novelty is tested according to all 
communications and uses before such filing. EPC, supra note 179, art. 54(1), (2).  
Arguably, the first-to-invent standard creates a greater risk for granting the patent to an 
applicant that is not the inventor, or his successor in right, than is the case with the first-
to-file standard.  Also, the first-to-invent standard, with its complex substantive and 
procedural characteristics, seems to benefit larger inventors and companies, whereas the 
first-to-file standard leads to equal consideration of all inventors, whether small or large. 
See Mossinghot & Kuo, supra note 447, at 542; Murashige, supra note 446, at 60809. 
But see Meller, supra note 462 (arguing that the first-to-invent standard, with its relative 
novelty requirement, is better suited to deal with communications in present timesthe 
fact that scientists and researchers collaborate in development of inventions and 
frequently share information, e.g. by e-mail).  EPC article 55(1)(a)(b) is not as harsh as 
he argues.  Of course, the narrow exceptions of EPC article 55(1)(a)(b) cannot negate 
Mellers argument, since they are only focused on a period of six months prior to the 
filing of the application, whereas the research and development usually takes several 
years before completion. 
465 See Meller, supra note 462, at 36769 (discussing unobviousness). 
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This may indicate that the EPO applies a lower nonobvioussness 
(inventive step) standard than the PTO.  Such application may be 
related to the pre-grant opposition system of EPO article 99, the 
first-to-file system, and the opportunity for compulsory licensing 
under EU patent law.466  The lower standard for the inventive step 
in the EU may also derive from the exclusion from patentability of 
animal races of EPC article 53(b).  This exclusion forces applicants 
to construct broad claims, not including one race but higher 
taxonomical units, even though their invention may be directly 
aimed at one animal variety or race only.  The EPO does not apply 
the enablement requirement in a strict manner, and therefore small 
inventive steps pass muster so as to make the patenting of 
transgenic animals possible.467  Pursuant to both the U.S. and EU 
patent laws, insertion of genes into an animal, wherein they are 
expressed, may lead to a patent on the animal.  One could argue, 
however, that the inventions involvedinsertion and expression of 
genesdo not justify a patent on the entire animal.  The 
mechanical equivalent would be to grant the inventor of a lens a 
patent on the camera to which it is attached.468  This practice 
derives from the characteristics of the inventions involved; they 
cannot be separated and distinguished from the animal, which, in 
turn, can reproduce itself.  Presently, there seems to be no 
alternative for this manner of protection of the inventions involved.  
Further research into the specific workings and influence of the 
inventions concerned may be deemed necessary.469  Nevertheless, 
 
466 See D.J. Abraham, Shinpo-Sei: Japanese Inventive Step Meets U.S. Nonobviousness, 
77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 528, 52930 (1995) (stating that the Japanese 
Patent Offices lower nonobviousness requirement may come from several factors, 
among which are the ones mentioned above, present in the EU). 
467 The proposal for a uniform application of a common standard for enablement is 
described infra Part V.B.6. 
468 See Harvard College v. Canada, [1998] 3 F.C. 510, revd, [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (Can.) 
(refusing to issue the patent for the Harvard mouse, holding that the insertion and 
expression of the gene in the mouse may be novel, but the mouse was not); R. Stephen 
Crespi, Patents and Plant Variety Rights: Is There an Interface Problem? INTL REV. 
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 16884 (1992) (analogizing of the mechanical parts to the 
car as a who and stating that this deviation from traditional patent law occurs with respect 
to both plant and animal biotechnological inventions). 
469 See Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for 
Evolutionary Biology in Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505, 1519 (2000).  Iwasaka 
proposes a test for novelty and nonobviousness that is based on a methodology used in 
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patent law harmonization is not needed as far as the patentability 
of transgenic animals as such is concerned. 
In the EU, however, a patent on a gene will, by operation of 
law, embrace the animal in which it is incorporated and expressed.  
This approach definitely evades legal discussion about the novelty 
of the animal, and its subjection to patent law, but completely 
ignores its traditional principles and requirements.  It is in line with 
the general pro-patent approach to inventions that comprise 
insertion and expression of genes into animals.  It may be called a 
cheap solution (rigorous expansion of the contents and scope of a 
patent) for an expensive problem (lack of insight into the actual 
invention while, protecting it in view of the reproductive capacities 
of the vehicle, the animal).  The same applies to the EPOs 
application of the inventive step requirement to applications that 
claim higher taxonomical units than races, or species.470  In this 
respect, it may be deemed appropriate to bring the patent law of 
the EU in line with the patent law of the U.S., where the original 
restrictive approach for nonobviousness is upheld. 
2. Animal Races 
In the EU, animal races are excluded from patentability if they 
are mentioned specifically in the application, but they are 
patentable if the application is directed at higher or lower 
taxonomical units.  Since they are thus patentable anyhow, by 
overbroad patents that embrace entire zoological orders, it would 
be more appropriate to follow the U.S. approach, meaning that an 
inventor can openly apply for a patent on a particular variety of an 
 
evolutionary biology; the human interference with the animal in its natural evolutionary 
course should be appraised according to factors such as the probability that the genetic 
mutation would have occurred without that interference, and the existence of the animal 
contrary to natural selection.  He argues that such a test would be more formalistic and 
would be more certain than the tests presently applied.  In the authors view, Iwasakas 
proposal offers a starting point for development of an appropriate novelty and 
nonobviousness test for an invention that consists of insertion and expression of strange 
genes in an animal.  It acknowledges that present standards derive from different times 
and are not optimally suited for application to these types of inventions. 
470 See infra Part V.B.2, .6. 
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animal race.  This will allow inventors to specify their invention 
and will prevent issuance of patents that do not cover their load.471 
3. Sexually Produced Offspring 
In the U.S., the products of entirely sexual (biological) 
processes may be patentable.  The EU approach differs only 
slightly, but enough to ensure that the products of processes of 
sexual reproduction are only patentable if the processes have been 
carried out with some human intervention.  The latter approach is 
most in compliance with the aim of patent law: stimulation of 
technological progress through an exchange of information 
(containing the particulars of a novel biotechnological 
advancement) and a patent.  Thus, the patent laws involved should 
be harmonized by adopting the EU approach. 
4. Morality 
In the U.S., the beneficial utility of an invention is not deemed 
to be important.  Most likely, the lack of beneficial utility (or 
immorality) of an invention will not be a limitation on its 
patentability.  In the EU, the exclusion from patentability of 
inventions that are violating ordre public or morality is active and 
applied, albeit restrictively.  Even though the exploitation of, for 
example, an extremely dangerous patented invention (lacking 
beneficial utility) is regulated by other laws than patent law in the 
U.S., one could argue that this does not sufficiently influence their 
development.  Arguably, an inventor who knows that he will not 
receive a patent on an invention will have a lot of trouble 
developing it, acquiring the necessary funds and recouping the 
expenses afterwards.  Also, one could argue that it is a matter of 
fairness that an inventor should, at least, have a reasonable 
expectation of its permitted exploitation after acquisition of the 
patent.  In view of the far-reaching impact of biotechnology, the 
importance of responsible and restrictive development is 
emphasized, and such can be ensured best through the instrument 
 
471 See TRIPS, supra note 454, art. 27(3) (allowing member states to exclude animal 
races from patentability).  The reason for this exclusion is that animal races can only be 
produced through biological and not technological meansis outdated and should be 
modified. 
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that so profoundly influences the rate at which biotechnological 
applications are developed, i.e., patent law.  Obviously, a moral 
test is hard to apply, but so is the test of nonobviousness, or, in 
general contract law, the tests of equity or reasonableness and 
fairness.  Naturally, legal rules must not be made dependent on the 
swiftly changing morality of the day, as their certainty and 
reliability is of great importance.  The rules themselves, however, 
exist because of morality, and it should be possible to develop a 
fairly accurate and certain moral test that can be applied to a 
particular invention.  In view hereof, it may be desirable to include 
consideration of all (including) features and consequences of an 
invention in the examination.  U.S. patent law should be brought 
into line with the patent law of the EU in this respect.472 
 
472 The balancing test provided for by the EPC, supra note 179, article 53(a), and 
Directive 98/44, supra note 185, article 6 may need specification and is not certain 
enough yet.  It does, however, provide a starting point for consideration of the moral 
impacts of an invention in patent examination. See Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by the 
Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality into European Union Biotechnology Law, 19 
BERKELEY J. INTL L. 40, 4043 (2001).  Note that Gitter ignores Case G 1/98, Novartis 
II, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. 111 (Enlarged Bd. of App. 1999), in her analysis.  A fairly accurate 
moral test could be developed by a collective of lawyers, ethicists, biotechnologists, and 
anthropologists, with the aid of the general public, through a detailed and specific 
referendum.  The test should be incorporated into the relevant patent acts involved, to 
make them as independent as possible from the morals of the day and to prevent 
administrative agencies, such as the PTO and EPO, from developing their own.  Note in 
this respect the PTOs exclusion from patentability of human/animal chimaeras, supra 
note 118.  For possible ethical rules, see supra note 158.  The scholars, who favor 
exclusion of any moral limitation on patentability because patent law should only be 
directed at the technology, would possibly agree with the patentability of human beings; 
their exclusion is entirely based on the PTOs invocation of morality.  Although they 
could be correct in agreeing thereto, further research needs to be done, and important 
policy decisions need to be taken, before these far-reaching standpoints can be 
appropriately defended.  The same applies to the moral implications of patentability of 
transgenic animals, particularly because of the unclear biological distinction between 
animals and human beings.  Moreover, one should not ignore that other inventions than 
those directed at transgenic animals are not at the crossroad of biology and technology, 
and therefore fit in perfectly with the patent system as it was originally framed.  Debates 
about what is good and what is wrong are initiated now because of the involvement 
of organisms with a high psychological capacity.  Legal scholars, legislators and patent 
officers cannot completely withdraw from this debate and hide behind the argument that 
patent law is only directed at technology.  Patent law was directed at technology only; 
presently, it is directed at biotechnology as well. 
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5. Human-Based Inventions 
Both the patent laws of the U.S. and the EU more or less 
exclude human-related inventions from patentability.  EU patent 
law contains a statutory exclusion, whereas the exclusion in the 
U.S. is based on the policy of the PTO.  In view of the broad 
impact of patentability of transgenic humans (or animals), it may 
be highly desirable to include a particular statutory provision in 
U.S. patent law that deals with this issue.  Moreover, both regimes 
lack a clear definition of what constitutes a human being and 
what constitutes an animal.  In view of the rapidly advancing 
biotechnology, these definitions should be made and incorporated 
into patent law.473 
6. Enablement 
Both the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU lack an 
appropriate and workable standard for disclosure of the invention 
by a patent applicant.  That this is caused by the expression of a 
gene in an animal may not be readily observable.  This lack of 
disclosure has both an internal and external impact (respectively 
towards the patent office and towards third parties who request 
samples) that should be addressed by the legislatures and/or patent 
offices of both the U.S. and the EU. 
Nevertheless, in the U.S., the PTO applies a stringent test of 
enablement in the course of patent litigation.  It requires that an 
invention be fully repeatable and patent applicants can narrowly 
and specifically describe their invention in the application (the 
animal that is or expresses the invention).  Conversely, in the EU, 
the EPO does not apply a strict test of enablement, since otherwise 
no patents could be issued for transgenic animals.  The exclusion 
of animal races, as continues to be the case in EU patent law, 
forces applicants to formulate their invention as broadly as 
possible so as to not claim explicitly an animal that belongs to a 
particular race.  They will, therefore, claim a patent for an 
invention that is directed at a species or even higher taxonomical 
 
473 The definitions suggested by scholars may not suffice. See supra note 421.  A 
multidisciplinary approach by lawyers, ethicists, and biologists may provide a workable 
definition. 
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units, and such a claim may be awarded, whereas from a 
biotechnological point of view their invention most likely does not 
affect these units, and only affect, a particular race or some races.  
This leads to overbroad patents, which are contrary to the goals of 
patent law.  The EPO should, therefore, more strictly apply the 
enablement requirement, in line with the approach of the PTO.  In 
case the EU prefers to allow transgenic animals to be patented, the 
EPC and the patent laws of the member states should be revised 
and the exclusion of patentability of animal races excluded; other 
requirements of patent law, such as the enablement requirement, 
should not be sacrificed. 
7. Third Party Interests 
Clearly, third party interests are better protected by EU patent 
law than by U.S. patent law.  First, anyone who objects to a certain 
patent can file opposition against it until nine months after its 
initial issuance.474  Anyone can be heard through this procedure, 
and the EPO takes opposition seriously.  The initial uncertainty of 
the patentee (until nine months after the grant) is compensated by 
his/her increased certainty afterwards.  After issuance of the patent, 
most, if not all, objections against the patent are known and they 
have been considered by the EPO (and the newspaper reading 
public).  The patent will less likely be subjected to societal 
objection and action on the political level.  Second, designated 
authorities are empowered to issue compulsory licenses in case 
there is, for example, a pressing social need.475  The specificity and 
narrowness of the underlying competence ensures that this 
situation will not lead to uncertain patents.476  Hence, neither 
patentees nor society will suffer from an uncertain patent system. 
A compulsory license does, of course, touch upon the 
exclusiveness of the patent right.  One should bear in mind, 
 
474 EPC, supra note 179, art. 99. 
475 The compulsory licensing exemptions of the EPC and the patent laws of the EU 
member states derive from TRIPS, supra note 454, article 30. See Correa, supra note 
458, at 33033 (describing TRIPS grounds for granting a compulsory license and their 
workings). 
476 See Mossinghot & Kuo, supra note 447, at 547 (arguing that compulsory licenses 
should be part of a global patent system). 
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however, that patent law does not provide absolute proprietary 
rights, but relative ones that are limited in many ways, such as 
duration.  These limits are imposed for general societal reasons, for 
which the exclusive right itself was also created.  Patent offices 
application of the requirements of, and exclusions from, 
patentability changes continuously to meet the demands of our 
time, of new types of inventions and their inventors.  This is 
especially so with animal biotechnology, which, for example, 
shown by the particularly low standard of novelty that is applied to 
enable patentability of entire animals.  It does not make any sense 
to change the limits of the patent right only in favor of patentees 
and not to their detriment, in case both could be beneficial to 
society at large.  Adequate pecuniary compensation to the patentee, 
and a listing of a specified and limited number of purposes for 
which these licenses can be granted, with sufficient opportunity of 
representation, review and appeal, should safeguard the interests of 
patentees while at the same time protect those of society.477  In 
view hereof, U.S. patent law should be adapted to allow third-party 
interests to be included in the examination of the patent 
application, or to be set forth in another fashion.  Additionally, a 
system for compulsory licensing of patents on transgenic animals 
should be set up, and the regimes of the U.S. and the EU 
harmonized accordingly. 
Although development of a uniform global patent system may 
be considered ideal for adequate and appropriate patent protection, 
such a system is not likely to be formed in the near future.478  
Decisive steps should be taken by legislators to substantially 
harmonize the patent laws of the U.S. and the EU, at least insofar 
as the patentability of transgenic animals is concerned. 
 
477 See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical 
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 84344 (2001) 
(arguing that compulsory licenses should play a role in patent law for further research and 
to prevent anticompetitive behavior). 
478 See Meller, supra note 462; North, supra note 53, at 139. 
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CONCLUSION 
Biotechnology promises various beneficial applications for 
both human beings and animals.  Accordingly, research and 
development of these applications may be necessary.  In view of 
the far-reaching and great impact of biotechnological applications 
on the environment, the formation and development of life and, 
thus, evolution, responsible development is necessary as well.  
Patent law may be the legal instrument by which the 
biotechnological developments can, on one hand, be stimulated 
and enhanced, and, on the other, be controlled and guided.  The 
manner in, and extent to, biotechnological inventions, such as 
transgenic animals, can be patented by the inventors will have a 
profound influence on the pace at which their development takes 
place.  Inventors need to make investments, and investments need, 
at the least, to be recouped.  Society needs information about the 
state of technology at a certain moment, in order to stimulate 
continuance of technological developments.  Patent law connects 
these interests; governments through their patent offices grant 
inventors temporary monopolies on the exploitation of their 
invention, in return for a description thereof.  Therefore, patent law 
has become an instrument for enhancing biotechnological 
development as well.  In view of the strong incentive most 
inventors have to apply for patents for their inventions, patent law 
may also serve societys interest in guiding and controlling the 
development of these inventions.  Patent offices may assess the 
non-technological aspects of an invention, as described in the 
patent applicationfor example, the benefits of the invention for 
humankind and the dangers and other negative consequences that 
may derive from it.  The balance that is struck will determine the 
rate at which biotechnological developments will proceed 
responsibly. 
Both the patent regimes of the U.S. and the EU provide patents 
for transgenic animals, either directly or via a patent on a process 
that extends to the animal.  In the EU, however, patent protection 
may also be obtained via a patent on a gene that has been inserted 
and expressed in an animal.  This manner of protection for 
transgenic animals is not available in the U.S.  Both European and 
U.S. patent law permit patents for products that, except for minor 
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alterations, exist in nature.  The patent offices and/or courts apply a 
low standard for novelty and nonobviousness (inventive step), and 
for what constitutes technology and is man-made.  Thus, both 
regimes offer broad opportunities for an inventor to obtain a patent 
for his/her animal biotechnological inventions, including 
transgenic animals. 
Given the degree of modification of the animals concerned, one 
may doubt whether the standards that patent offices apply in this 
context are appropriate.  Greater insight into the actual impact of 
the biotechnological application on the animal is needed, in order 
to allow patent offices to determine more accurately where the 
influence and workings of the invention end and the natural animal 
remains.  In the U.S., the PTOs examination of patent applications 
does not necessarily include considerations of a non-technical 
nature, such as the animal suffering that may derive from the 
claimed invention.  Conversely, these considerations are included 
in the examination of patent applications for transgenic animals in 
the EU.  The EPOs examination of the various interests occurs 
through a balancing test.  It balances the expected benefits of the 
invention with the expected disadvantages, such as damages to the 
environment and animal suffering.  Both patent regimes exclude 
inventions that embrace human materials from patentability to a 
greater or lesser extent.  Nevertheless, both regimes lack clear 
definitions for what constitutes material of human origin, and what 
constitutes human beings and animals.  The formation of these 
definitions, and their incorporation into patent law by the 
legislature or into the patent offices guidelines, is very important, 
for the technology will provide more and more potentially 
interesting and useful possibilities to combine genetic parts of 
human beings with the genetic parts of animals. 
In the U.S., animal varieties, races, and species can be 
patented.  In the EU, only animal varieties that are not claimed as 
such can be patented.  This forces applicants to draft broader 
claimsmost likely broader than is justified by their actual 
invention.  At the same time, the standard for enablement has been 
lowered by the EPO, whereby inventors can actually obtain these 
broad patents.  This will not serve the prime goals of patent law 
and weakens the connection and balance that patent law provides 
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between the interests of patentees and the interests of society.  In 
the U.S., inventors can focus their claim on their actual invention, 
regardless whether such comprises a variety, race, or species.  
Subsequently, the PTO can apply a strict and traditional standard 
for enablement, thus allowing for patents that are justified by the 
invention.  This approach serves the goals of patent law in a better 
way.  Given the autonomy of the national patent offices and courts 
in the EU, referenced exclusion from patentability of varieties and 
races, and the low standard of enablement set by the EPO, may not 
be adhered to on the national level.  On one hand, this may serve as 
a safeguard against said broad unjustified patents and, on the other, 
this may create legal uncertainty for patentees.  This may 
undermine the function of patent law, and particularly will frustrate 
the objectives of the EPC. 
Both regimes give broad scopes to the patents granted on 
transgenic animals; offspring may be included.  In the EU, 
however, the patent on the initial product generally also covers 
animals multiplied by non-sexual reproduction from those 
products, such as cloning.  This seems to contrast with the overall 
situation in the U.S.  Under U.S. law, outsiders do not have 
means at their disposal to influence the process through which the 
PTO grants patents.  Also, they cannot challenge the scope, 
contents and validity of patents granted, other than on grounds of 
prior art. Conversely, in the EU the EPC provides for an 
opposition procedure to anyone who objects to the application or 
issuance of a patent by the EPO, e.g., on moral grounds.  This 
procedure recognizes the universal and far-reaching impact of 
animal biotechnology and gives interested parties a chance to be 
involved and heard.  The patent regimes of the EU provide for 
farmers and breeders exceptions to the broad scope of transgenic 
animal patentsthis may serve their economic need.  The U.S. 
patent regime lacks such provisions.  This may economically 
burden small breeders and farmers who want to acquire and use 
patented animal material.  Also, the patent regimes of the EU 
generally provide for compulsory licensing, whereas such a system 
is foreign to U.S. patent law.  Compulsory licensing may provide 
an escape to situations wherein a patentee ignores a pressing 
societal need for use of the patented invention and is not willing to 
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license at all for a reasonable royalty.  Since the designated 
authorities in the EU rarely grant compulsory licenses, and if they 
do, only against reasonable royalties, patentees do not have to fear 
significant weakening of their position under a regime that 
provides for these licenses. 
The European patent regime takes account of moral and 
societal concerns that are related to transgenic animals.  The EPO 
considers these concerns directly under the exclusionary provisions 
of the EPC, and also pursuant to oppositions filed by outsiders in 
the opposition procedure.  This is a signal of responsible patent 
policy, but the EPOs formalistic approach regarding EPC article 
53(b)s exclusion of animal varieties and, consequently, the low 
standard it sets for enablement conflicts with the goals and 
function of patent law as well.  This is a signal of irresponsible 
patent policy.  Conversely, the PTOs purely technological and 
narrow approach toward the patentability of transgenic animals 
ignores the important non-technological interests that are involved 
and is a signal of irresponsible patent policy.  Its strict application 
of the enablement requirement is a signal of responsible patent 
policy and serves the primary objectives of patent law best.  The 
low standards that are applied by both the EPO and the PTO for 
traditional conditions for patentability, such as novelty and 
nonobviousness, are indications of a pro-patent approach that may 
lead to patents that are unjustified by the inventions.  This is a 
signal of irresponsible patent policy. 
The discrepancies between U.S. and European patent law 
concern important issues; e.g., whether countries should enhance 
technological developments neutrally without paying attention to 
their moral and social consequences; or whether it should be 
recognized that patent law does not function in a social vacuum, 
but is one of the instruments with which we govern and direct our 
societies, both in their technical and ethical character.  Clearly, this 
author favors the latter approach.  Another issue would be the 
degree to which principles of patent law, for example full 
disclosure and repeatability of the invention in exchange for the 
patent, should be negated to accommodate the needs of present 
inventors and their inventions.  Clearly, this author favors a 
conservative approach, deviating not too much from the initial 
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patent law approach, unless such can be founded in extensive legal 
and biological knowledge and understanding.  The universal 
impact of biotechnology requires a universal stimulus and 
guidance.  This can only be achieved by harmonization of patent 
law.  This cannot be achieved easily through multilateral 
processes.  Thus, it is necessary for legislators in the respective 
jurisdictions to pursue harmonization of their patent laws 
multilaterally and to adjust these laws fully to the need of our time.  
As they say, procrastination is the thief of time, and it may also 
become the thief of many promising developments or the 
accomplice of irresponsibility and its impact on future life and 
society.  Cum tacent clamant!479 
 
 
479 [By their silence, they emphasize it even more!] 
